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1. General Introduction
The objective of the state of the art report is to provide an overview of the state of
knowledge in each of the subprojects and to sketch briefly how the research to be
carried out will complement and contribute to this body of knowledge. Since there has
been very little research on the objects of the subprojects on Parliament, Council and
comitology, their reports are relatively brief. It is an entirely different story with the
theoretical project on legitimacy and EU-committees, where the authors have tried to
focus on the key issues, referring only to publications that are most relevant for our
research. The subject matter could easily fill a book.
The research team felt it was important to include in the report also a brief outline of
the empirical research and the methodology to be used during the research project.
This helped to focus the issues to be addressed, identified still existing weaknesses in
coordination between the various subprojects and provided a better overview of the
total project. At this stage it was not yet possible to link the theoretical issues of the
subproject on legitimacy to the empirical subprojects. This is work that will have to be
carried out in the next few months. The theoretical considerations will have to be
integrated in the empirical work particularly into the questionnaires of the other two
subprojects. The reader will nonetheless most certainly realize the significance of the
theoretical reflections and the way they will provide the over-all framework for the
whole project.
For practical reasons and in view of these considerations, the four subprojects in the
report stand more or less on their own. Each also contains its own bibliography. In
preparing this state of the art report the need to integrate the four subprojects was
realized by every member of the team. The objective of addressing the questions and
fundamental issues raised by the theoretical subproject in the empirical work of the
other three subprojects has emerged as a top priority for the activities in the next four
months. It will also be a top priority for the discussions at the next workshop.© EIPA May 2000 2
2. Subproject 1: The Standing Committees in the European Parliament
Christine Neuhold© EIPA May 2000 3
2.1. Introduction
This paper is starting with the assumption that the existing body of knowledge about
committees of the European Parliament (EP) is rather limited. Although most general
studies on the EU include a chapter on the EP, the specific studies on the workings of
its committees are, for the most part, not only descriptive, but also very brief.
This report will put the EP committees into a more general context, by highlighting
major points in the evolutionary process of the EP from consultative assembly to co-
legislator.
An overview will subsequently be given about the existing body of knowledge on
how EP committees function both in the legislative and implementing process. The
paper will close by focusing on approach, methodology and open questions of our
research.
2.2. The Evolution of the European Parliament: From Consultative Assembly
to Co-legislator
The fact that the EP is now commonly seen as co-legislator with the Council is a
relatively new development. For more than three decades it did not enjoy any
effective rights of participation in the legislative process. It started out as an assembly
possessing only two major powers: the competence to pass a motion of censure
against the High Authority
1 and the right to be consulted by the Council on selected
legislative proposals. The opinions, given in this classical consultation procedure,
were non-binding.
The original 142 members of the EP were not directly elected, but delegated by the
national parliaments of the Member States. Although the possibility of direct elections
was provided for in the Treaty of Rome (1957), due to the reluctance on the part of
the Member States it took almost 20 years for the Council to give its consent to this
step. The first elections were finally held in June 1979, when 410 members of the EP
(MEPs) were elected from nine Member States according to the national election
procedures of their respective countries.
The Single European Act (SEA) (1987) represented a major step forward for the EP.
It marked the beginning of a new “triangular relationship”
2 between the Council, the
Commission and the EP by introducing the cooperation procedure, which improved
inter-institutional dialogue significantly, giving the EP the first chance to "flex its
legislative muscles" and the possibility to exploit its “agenda setting powers”.
3 The
workings of the procedure showed that the Community institutions were able to come
to a compromise rather quickly: the procedure lasted 734 days on average.
  The
                                                
1 The forerunner of the European Commission.
2 Westlake, Martin (1994): A modern guide to the European Parliament, Pinter Publishers, London and
New York, p. 135.
3 For a detailed account of these conditional “agenda setting powers” and an illustrative example on
how the EP used these powers to its favour, see Tsebilis, George: “The Power of the European
Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter”, in: American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, pp. 128-
142.© EIPA May 2000 4
relevant data reflects that the Commission significantly contributed to the successful
conclusion of the procedure.
4 At the beginning of the new millennium, the
cooperation procedure, which was principally linked to the completion of the internal
market, is, however, loosing importance. After the Amsterdam Treaty, it has only
been retained for matters falling within the sphere of Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU).
2.2.1. The EP as a Legislative Actor after Maastricht
Building on the positive experiences gained during the cooperation procedure, the
EP’s legislative competences were extended by the Treaty on European Union (TEU)
– the so-called Maastricht Treaty (1993). Through the introduction of the co-decision
procedure the MEPs were, for the first time, granted the power of veto in several
policy areas.
5
The innovative element of the procedure lies in the possibility to convene a
conciliation committee in order to reach a compromise between the Council and the
EP. The committee, which is composed of members of the Council or their
representatives and an equal number of representatives from the European Parliament,
has to reach an agreement on a compromise text within the very short time-span of six
weeks. The Commission is also represented in the conciliation committee where its
role is circumscribed, however, as it can no longer withdraw its proposals and prevent
an agreement between EP and Council.
The EP was not put on a completely equal footing with the Council. The Council still
had the possibility, if conciliation failed, to confirm its common position by qualified
majority. The EP was then left with a “take it or leave it option”: either it rejected the
text by an absolute majority of its members or did not act within six weeks. This put
the EP into the uncomfortable position of being seen, in the latter instance, as
responsible for the failure of a legislative act as it was forced to put in its veto in the
final stage of the procedure.
                                                
4 See: Maurer, Andreas (1998): “Regieren nach Maastricht: Die Bilanz des Europäischen Parlaments
nach fünf Jahren Mitentscheidung”, in: integration 4/98, p. 218.
5 Initially only 15 Treaty items were covered by the procedure, covering articles falling into the policy
fields of the internal market, consumer protection, trans-European networks, cultural policy, public
health and education. See: Smith, Julie (1999): Europe’s Elected Parliament, Contemporary European
Studies, 5, Sheffield Academic Press, Sheffield p. 75.© EIPA May 2000 5
Consequently, the EP used its power of veto extremely sparingly. Up to the end of the
1994-1999 legislative term, a total of 379 legislative proposals had been forwarded to
the EP according to the co-decision procedure, of which 200 have been concluded. In
166 cases, the Commission's proposals have resulted in binding secondary
legislation.
6 Two cases failed, as the conciliation committee could reach no
agreement. Only in one case – the legal protection of biotechnological inventions –
did the EP plenary reject a compromise agreement, which had been laboriously
prepared over several conciliation meetings. As the Council was also split on this
matter, it did not make use of the possibility of reaffirming its common position.
The potential and the dynamics of the co-decision procedure are reflected in the
evolving relationship between the EP and the Council. The amount both of formal and
informal contacts have increased significantly since the introduction of the procedure,
bringing representatives of both institutions to the negotiating table in search of
compromise and consensus.
The Treaty of Maastricht has, by introducing the co-decision procedure, presented
both the Council and the EP, as well as to a certain extent the Commission, with a
major challenge. It has enhanced cooperation between the institutions and given rise
to new patterns of negotiations, preparing the ground for the interaction of the co-
legislators after the coming into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999).
2.2.2. EP and Council on an Even Footing after Amsterdam
The Treaty of Amsterdam strengthens the EP’s role considerably, especially as
regards its involvement in the legislative process. The co-decision procedure has been
extended from 15 to 38 Treaty articles. It now applies to new areas within the fields of
transport, environment, energy, development cooperation and certain aspects of social
affairs. For certain areas
7 within the third pillar, it is stipulated that the co-decision
procedure should come into effect five years after the entry into force of the Treaty.
The EP is still, for the most part, excluded from policy fields such as the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP), fiscal harmonisation and the conclusion of international
agreements (except for association agreements).
 8 There are also new cases of “non-
involvement” of the EP, the consultation procedure having been expanded by nine
Treaty provisions. The EP is, for example, only asked to give an opinion on
recommendations on employment policy and on agreements concluded by the
European social partners.
9 It is noteworthy that in its opinion of 26 January 2000 on
the next IGC on institutional reform, the Commission proposes an extension of the
                                                
6 The Commission's proposal failed in 24 cases. In 17 of these, the procedure lapsed because the
Council was unable to adopt a common position and in four cases the Commission withdrew its
proposal prior to the first reading in the EP. See: Maurer, Andreas (1999): (Co-)Governing after
Maastricht: The European Parliament’s institutional performance 1994 – 1999. Lessons for the
implementation of the Treaty of Amsterdam. Study for the European Parliament, Directorate General
for Research submitted under Contract No. IV/99/23, p. 11.
7 Visa procedures and conditions (article 62(2bii) TEC) and Visa uniformity rules (article 62(2biv)
TEC).
8 Article 37 TEC (ex-43); Article 152 (4) TEC (ex-129); Article 93 TEC (ex-99); Article 300 TEC (2)
(ex-228).
9 Article 128 (4) new title on employment and Article 139 (ex-118b). See: Nentwich, Michael; Falkner,
Gerda (1997): The Treaty of Amsterdam: Towards a New Institutional Balance, European Integration
online Papers (EIoP) Vol. 1 (1997) No. 015; http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-015a.htm.© EIPA May 2000 6
scope of co-decision to common commercial policy rules such as basic anti-dumping
rules and to legislative aspects of the CAP and the common fisheries policy.
10 It
remains to be seen whether Member States can agree on an enhanced legislative role
of the EP in these fields, which currently fall under the intergovernmental domain.
2.2.2.1. The Streamlining of the Co-decision Procedure
A significant new element in the Amsterdam Treaty is the streamlining of the co-
decision procedure. Most importantly, the possibility now exists to adopt a legislative
act during the first reading, if either the EP proposes no amendments to the
Commission proposal or if the Council agrees to the changes put forward by the EP.
The significance of this new step becomes apparent when one considers the
functioning of the co-decision procedure after Maastricht: of the total number of
procedures finalised between November 1993 and June 1999, over 55% could have
been concluded after the first reading, as the EP did not put forward any amendments
to the common position or as the Council approved all parliamentary changes.
11 This
seems to suggest that the new procedure might lead to an acceleration and
simplification of the legislative process. The practice of the procedure so far has
shown however that in this first stage of the decision-making process, dossiers have
not been passed for the most part except when technical matters were at stake. From
May 1999 until the end of 1999, four legal acts were concluded at the first reading, a
phase which now starts simultaneously in the Council and the EP. These acts covered
the approximation and adaptation of laws on technical issues within the fields of:
measurement;
12 the Trans-European Networks (TENs);
13 animal health protection;
14
and the CAP
15.
There was one notable exception to the “rule” that only technical issues can be
resolved at the first reading stage: the establishment of a European fraud prevention
office (OLAF) in May 1999. It was of high political significance after the European
Commission resigned in March 1999 due to allegations of fraud, mismanagement and
nepotism. This legal act was concluded under extreme time pressure to convey the
impression that the Community institutions were undertaking all possible measures
within their means to combat fraud and corruption. The Commission put forward its
(modified) proposal in March 1999 and the legal act was adopted just two months
later.
 16
                                                
10European Commission (2000): Adapting the institutions to make a success of enlargement.
Commission opinion in accordance with Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union on the calling of a
Conference of representatives of the governments of the Member States to amend the Treaties, p. 27.
11 Maurer (1999): op.cit., p. 8.
12 See: 1999/0014/COD.
13 Decision 1741/1999/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers.
14 Directive 1999/72/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers.
15 Directive 1999/87/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers.
16 Regulation 1073/1999/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers concerning
investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). The new act on the Fraud
Prevention Office provides, inter alia, that the Office has its own right of initiative to carry out
investigations, will be totally independent from instructions from Member States  and that
investigations can be carried out in the Member States as well as in all bodies, institutions and offices
in the Community, http://wwwdb.europarl.eu.int/oeil/oeil.© EIPA May 2000 7
A model for cooperation between the institutions developed under the Finnish
Presidency during the second half of 1999, involving the newly elected EP and the
new Commission. A series of contacts were established between the Council and the
EP spanning the following levels:
•   Working Group chairman - EP rapporteur;
•   COREPER chairman - EP committee chairman;
The European Commission is involved as a mediator.
17
The difficulty, which the institutions face, at least at present, is that the stage of first
reading is used by the institutions to lay down their own positions before they are
ready to embark on extensive inter-institutional liaison and bargaining. Negotiations
are complicated by the fact that the individuals concerned do not have a mandate, as
internal discussions are still underway in their respective institutions. The Council
negotiator has to keep in constant contact with the Member States, most conveniently
through the Council Working Party. The negotiator for the EP has to ensure that
positions of his/her political group, the respective parliamentary committee and of the
plenary are reconciled.
  It is therefore rather difficult for the negotiators to make
concessions as regards politically sensitive matters.
A second innovation of the Amsterdam Treaty significantly strengthened the power of
the EP in the legislative process: the abolition of the so-called third reading. Before
Amsterdam the Council had had the right to adopt its common position after the
conciliation procedure had failed, unless the EP could mobilise a majority of its
members to put in its veto. According to the new procedure, the draft legal act is
deemed to have failed in the absence of agreement in conciliation. The EP is no
longer in the uncomfortable position of having to use the emergency brake, i.e. having
to reject the Council’s common position and therefore, in the last instance, bearing the
sole responsibility for the defeat of a piece of legislation. After Amsterdam, both the
Council and the EP are now deemed to be responsible for the failure of a legal act.
18
2.3.  The Role of the EP Committees in the Legislative Process
Hand in hand with the increase of the powers of the EP went a revaluation of the EP
Standing Committees, which have been described as the “legislative backbone”
19 of
the EP. Everything that could conceivably be dealt with by the EP falls under the
competence of these committees, which officially only examine questions, which are
referred by the bureau. In the practical political process, incoming legislative
proposals go directly to the responsible committee or committees.
20
The number of EP Standing Committees, whose competences are laid down in annex
VI to Parliament’s Rules of Procedure,
21 was reduced from 20 to 17 subsequent to the
                                                
17 Information provided by the Finnish Permanent Representation, Brussels.
18 Neuhold, Christine (2000): Into the New Millennium: The Evolution of the European Parliament
from Consultative Assembly to Co-legislator, in: Eipascope, No. 2000/1, p. 3-11.
19 Westlake (1994): op. cit., p. 191.
20 Neunreither, Karlheinz (1999): “The European Parliament”, in: Cram, Laura; Dinan, Desmond;
Nungent, Neil (eds.): Developments in the European Union, Macmillan Press, Houndmills,
Basingstoke, p. 78.
21 European Parliament (1999): Rules of Procedure, 14
th edition, http://www.europarl.eu.int/omk/.© EIPA May 2000 8
June 1999 elections. They each cover a particular area or policy field of EU-activities
and now have been "reshuffled" to:
•   represent stronger issue "clusters" (external economic relations has been
merged with "industry" and "research" and the committee on regional policy
now includes the policies of "transport" and "tourism"),
•   to emphasize new priorities (e.g. equal opportunities now has a more
prominent role in the committee on women's rights and the same is true for
human rights in the committee on foreign affairs),
•   or to provide a greater committee overview.
The 17 Standing Committees of the European Parliament (1999-2004)
1. Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, CFSP 11. Fisheries
2. Budgets  12. Regional Policy, Transport &
3. Budgetary Control  Tourism
4. Citizens' Freedoms & Rights, JHA 13. Culture, Youth, Education,
5. Economic & Monetary Affairs Media, Sport
6. Legal Affairs & the Internal Market 14. Development & Cooperation
Opportunities 15. Constitutional Affairs
7. Industry, External Trade, Research & 16. Women's Rights & Equal
Energy 17. Petitions
8. Employment & Social Affairs
9. Environment, Public Health & Consumer Policy
22
10.  Agriculture & Rural Development
The EP's committee structure does not correspond to any particular model. The
Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, CFSP committee is, according to Westlake
23, clearly
modelled on its equivalent in the United States' Senate, but has far less powers. Its
Committee for Economic and Monetary Affairs corresponds much more closely to the
German Arbeitsparlament model. Due the fact that the EP is - as the only directly
elected trans-national parliament - an institution sui generis, the EP committees have
their own distinctive characters and styles, resulting from a combination of their
functions, active members and chairmen.
In addition to its Permanent or Standing Committees, the EP has the right - according
to article 193 TEC (ex-138) - to set up a temporary C Co om mm mi it tt te ee e    o of f    I In nq qu ui ir ry y to
investigate "alleged contraventions or maladministration in the implementation of
Community law." In the course of 1996 two committees of inquiry were established,
the first to examine the Community transit system and the second to investigate the
origins and the developments of the BSE crisis. Both completed their work in early
1997.
 24
                                                
22 For the sake of brevity this committee will hereafter be referred to as the Environment Committee.
23 Westlake (1994): op. cit., p. 135.
24 For more details see: Shackleton, Michael (1998): The European Parliament's New Committees of
Inquiry: Tiger or Paper Tiger?, in: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 36, No.1, pp. 115 – 129.© EIPA May 2000 9
Besides committees, Inter-parliamentary Delegations have an important role in the life
of the EP. These delegations are the means by which the EP may discuss foreign trade
policy or trade issues with parliamentarians from third countries. They were first set
up in the framework of association agreement with Greece and Turkey in the early
1960s with the aim to assure a link between the EP and the parliament of the
associated country. They are composed of an equal number of MPs of both sides, with
a mixed chairmanship and secretariat. The scope of the committees was expanded
continuously with the result that practically the whole world is now covered by more
than 15 such delegations.
In the framework of Europe Agreements and similar agreements establishing close
relations between the EU and third countries, inter-parliamentary delegations have
been upgraded to Joint Parliamentary Committees. Joint Parliamentary Committees
are formed with parliamentarians from associated countries or from countries, which
have applied for membership. In the latter case, the Joint Committees have no formal
responsibility, but in general they monitor the course of the accession negotiations. In
the framework of the association agreements, the Joint Committees are responsible for
monitoring their implementation in the EU and the countries concerned.
25
2.3.1. Membership in EP Committees
The membership of the committees aims to broadly reflect the political and national
balance of the EP as a whole. Committee members are appointed by way of political
negotiation in the constituent session after an election. The most recent ones took
place in July 1999, taking the stronger position of the centre-right political groups
European People/European Democrats (EEP/ED) into account. The committee
members are elected during the first part-session following the re-election of the EP
and again two and a half years thereafter.
Each committee has a chairman and up to three vice-chairmen. For the nomination of
these posts the new EP has applied the so-called d'Hondt formula: a mechanism that
assures the large political groups the majority of the posts. Consequently, eight of the
chairs of the 17 committees are from the EEP/ED, while six are from the PES. As was
the case in the EP prior to the 1999 election, only three committee chairs are held by
the other groups (Group of Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party; the Group of the
Greens/European Free Alliance; and the European United Left/Nordic Green Left
Group).
 26 The allocation of chair positions in the committees has been characterised
by a remarkable stability despite the change of majority in favour of the EPP/ED, as
the committee chairmen are only in theory elected by their respective committees.
 In
practice, however, their selection is almost always, as Martin Westlake argues, a
formality. Their selection lies within the realm of the political groups and depends
primarily on national contingents within political groups. There has only been one
direct "transfer" between the EPP/ED replacing the PES in the Environment
Committee and the PES taking over the chair of the Economic & Monetary Affairs
Committee from the EPP/ED. The committee chairmen can be powerful political
players, both within their committees and within the EP as whole and with respect to
other Community institutions. This is especially true for those committees with an
                                                
25 Neunreither (1999): op. cit. p. 78f. See also: The EU Committee of the American Chamber of
Commerce in Belgium: Guide to the European Parliament 1999-2004, Brussels, p. 38.
26 The EU Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce in Belgium (1999): op. cit., p. 23f.© EIPA May 2000 10
important inter-institutional function – such as Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, CFSP,
Budgets and Legal Affairs & the Internal Market and those carrying heavy legislative
loads or possessing extensive legislative powers. After the coming into force of the
Maastricht Treaty the EP rules of procedure were changed in such a way as to
formalise their collective powers by establishing a Conference of Committee
Chairmen. Its formal function is to make recommendations about the work of the
committees and the drafting of the agenda of the part sessions. This, at first sight weak
power, is in fact extensive in the practical political process. The Conference of the
Committee Chairmen has become an essential element in the successful functioning
of the EP's legislative machinery, by "having their collective finger on the
Parliament's legislative pulse."
27
Committees appoint a rapporteur for each proposal or issue to be dealt with who
prepares a draft report, taking into account the contributions of other committees. The
position of rapporteur is one of high political prestige, especially if the report is going
to receive a lot of publicity. While each committee is formally responsible for
nominating its own rapporteur, the political groups will supervise and closely follow
the appointment of rapporteurs and are likely to intervene if necessary.
28
The size (between 20 and 65 members)
29 and the importance of the committees differ
depending on the topics they deal with and also upon the legislative powers the EP
has in specific areas. The committees are assisted in their work by professional staff
of the Secretariat General in Luxembourg and in Brussels.
30
2.3.2. Powers and Competences of EP Committees
Meeting in the two weeks following the plenary session, the committees prepare the
work of the EP. The parliamentary committees, combining practical and theoretical
expertise, have formal powers such as:
•   tabling oral questions to the Council and the Commission;
•   tabling questions to external experts;
31
•   tabling resolutions following statements by the other Community institutions;
•   proposing amendments to the Parliament’s plenary agenda.
The most important powers of the EP committees are however connected to the
legislative process, in which:
•   the EP can put requests to the Commission for legislative proposals
32 which
must be based on reports initiated by an EP committee;
                                                
27 Westlake (1994): op. cit., p. 194.
28 Neunreither, Karlheinz (1999): op. cit., p. 78.
29 The Committee on Fisheries has 20 Members. The Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights,
Common Security and Defence Policy is composed of 65 Members.
30 Of the EP's 3,500 staff (not counting the groups staff of about 700 and a large number of private
assistants to MEPs), about 1,000 are based in Brussels. The others, including most of the purely
administrative and translation services, are still in Luxembourg.
31 Any of the standing committees or subcommittees of the European Parliament may organise a
hearing of experts if it considers this essential to the effective conduct of its work on a particular
subject (Rule 151 of the Rules of Procedure). Such hearings may be held in public or in camera.
32 Art. 192 (ex – 138b).© EIPA May 2000 11
•   all legislative proposals and other legislative documents must be considered in
committee, where the bulk of the legislative process under all legislative
procedures takes place, from the tabling of amendments to the scrutiny of the
Council's common position. The Council and the Commission are required,
once a month, to provide information to the EP about their proposals and
intentions. The work of the committees then consists in drawing up reports and
opinions on proposals for legislation. These build on formal consultations of
the EP with the Commission and the Council (or on the EPs own initiative):
"En votant des amendements qui modifient les propositions du Conseil et de la
Commission, les élus affirment leur pouvoir, en proportion des enjeux que
recèlent les textes. Ici le travail des commissions parlementaires est décisif, car
la qualitè de l'argumentation, de sa formulation, de son soubassement
juridique, est essentielle, lorqu'on atteint le jour fatidique de la plénière."
33
When a committee has been allocated a specific issue, the committee appoints
its rapporteur,
  who draws up a text, which is presented to all committee
members. If the text is adopted it is sent to the committee secretariat and
translated into the eleven official languages. It is then submitted to the plenary
as a sessional document and only at this point in time becomes open to the
public.
34
As our specific research is dealing with the following selected policy areas, it might
be useful to give an overview of the briefs of the EP committees active in these
respective policy fields:
-  Environment: The responsibilities of the EP Committee on the Environment,
Public Health and Consumer Protection include: EU environmental policy and
protection measures at regional and international level, including pollution,
recycling, climate change, dangerous substances, noise, waste, protection of fauna,
protection of the seas, European Environmental Agency; public health, including
food content, safety & labelling of foodstuffs, pharmaceutical products, medical
research, public health checks, cosmetic products, civil protection, including the
protection of consumers' economic interests and provision of better information;
-  Culture: The EP Committee on Culture, Youth, Education, Sport and the Media
deals with issues such as: cultural aspects of the EU, including the knowledge and
dissemination of culture, the conservation of a cultural heritage, cultural
exchanges and artistic creation; the EU's education policy, including the teaching
and dissemination of Member State languages, student and teacher mobility,
cooperation among educational establishments, development of distance education
and life-long learning and the development of the European University and
promotion of European Schools; youth policy, including youth exchange (with the
exception of young workers), the European voluntary service or the European
Youth Forum; the audiovisual industry and educational aspects of the information
society; information and media policy; the development of a sports and leisure
policy; cooperation with third countries and international organisations in the
fields of culture and education;
                                                
33 Abélés, Marc (1995): La fonction politique Européenne acteurs et enjeux, in: Mény, Yves; Mueller,
Pierre; Jean-Louis Quermonne (eds) : Politiques Publiques en Europe, L'Harmattan, Paris, p. 68f.
34 The EU Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce in Belgium (1999): op. cit, p. 23f© EIPA May 2000 12
-  Research and Development and Telecommunications; (including the liberalisation
of the electricity market): The EP Committee on Industry, External Trade Policy,
Research and Energy focuses on the following topics: industrial policy and its
application in specific sectors (e.g. Trans-European networks in
telecommunications infrastructure sector or the freedom to provide services or
Community technical standards); monitoring the Community's common
commercial policy; pre-industrial research (such as the framework research
programme); energy policy   and energy supplies. .
- -    Social Affairs: The EP Committee on Social Affairs and Employment has the
following responsibilities: Employment policy; social policy including protection
of living and working conditions, wages and pensions, collective protection of
workers' and employers' interests, social security, social cohesion, employment
conditions for legal residents from third countries, housing schemes; social
dimension of the information society; European Social Fund; vocational training;
free movement of workers; social dialogue; discrimination.
-  Internal market: The responsibilities of the Committee on Legal Affairs & the
Internal Market include (besides issues such as the legal aspects of the creation,
interpretation and application of Community law, which are not of main interest
for our specific project) questions such as the co-ordination of national legislation
concerning the single market; consumers' legal protection and ethical questions
related to new technologies.
2.3.2.1. Case Studies on EP Committees
Only few case studies
35 have been carried out concerning EP committees, where a
notable one was conducted by Earnshaw and Judge in the early/mid-nineties.
36 The
most prominent objective was to assess and evaluate the actual contribution of the
Environment Committee to the development of EC environment policy.
The main findings of this case study can be summarized as follows:
-  The role of the Environment Committee in the initiation stage: The Environment
Committee was exceptional by producing a considerable amount of 'own initiative
reports', where its initiatives sometimes culminated in the genesis of directives.
37
-  Closely connected is the role of the Environment Committee as an agenda setter.
In cases such as the eventual Commission proposals on landfill of waste the
Environment Committee engaged in a pro-active strategy of articulating its own
policy concerns to the Commission.
-  In the consultation procedure, where the Council is only required to consult the EP
on Commission proposals, the EP successfully maximised the significance of this
                                                
35 For an analysis of the European Parliament's New Committees of Inquiry, see: Shackleton, Michael
(1998): op. cit., pp. 115-130.
36 Earnshaw, David; Judge, David (1994): Weak European Parliament Influence? A Study of the
Environment Committee of the European Parliament, in: Government and Opposition, pp. 262-276.
37 These directives concerned issues such as major industrial hazards and the importation of seal pup
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procedure. In the Isoglucose ruling of the European Court of Justice of 1980, the
Court stated that the Council should not adopt Community legislation without
obtaining the EPs opinion. The EP then changed its rules of procedures as to allow
a draft legislative proposal to be referred back to the appropriate committee for
reconsideration. This threat of delay served to enhance the EPs bargaining
position with the Commission.
-  Under the co-operation procedure the EP has only in exceptional cases sought to
reject a common position, and only in four cases has it succeeded. It is significant
that two of these (successful) rejections involved the Environment Committee.
38
-  In the process of implementation the Environment Committee has been of some
importance trying to raise the profile of the issue. The committee has produced
several 'landmark' reports on the subject and tabled respective resolutions.
2.3.3. Effect of the Co-decision Procedure on the Work of the EP Standing
Committees
The co-decision procedure has enhanced the importance of the EPs committees
significantly and particularly the political skills of the committee chairs and
rapporteurs who carry out evaluations of specific proposals. The most powerful MEPs
are those, who play a dominant role in their committee, are well integrated into the
concerned sectoral policy networks and are consulted on a regular basis in the
initiative phase, when the Commission formulates its proposals.
39
The research conducted on the effect of the co-decision procedure on the EP
committees has shown that co-decision has led to a structural concentration of the
bulk of the workload in only 3 out of 20 (after 1999 - 17) Permanent Committees. The
3 committees dealing with the majority of the draft legal acts submitted under co-
decision were:
1.  The Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection;
2.  The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy;
3.  The Committee on Legal Affairs.
These three committees concerned handled almost 80 % of all procedures concluded
until the end of June 1999, which proved to be very time-consuming for committee
members. The concentration of co-decision on these three committees was primarily
due to the exploitation of the legal bases concerned. Since most of the procedures
were based on Art. 95 TEC (ex-90), the majority of concluded co-decision procedures
fell under the three committees mentioned above. As regards the distribution of these
"Art.-95-co-decisions", the Committee on the Environment was engaged 46 times, the
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy 29 times and the
Committee on Legal Affairs 13 times. As regards to the timespan needed to conclude
a co-decision procedure, the analysis reflects that the Environment Committee – with
the heaviest co-decision burden of all committees – stabilized the time required for
                                                
38 The common positions concerned were on a proposed directive on the protection of workers from
benzene in the workplace and on a proposal for a Directive on artifical sweeteners.
39 Peterson, John; Bomberg, Elizabeth (1999): Decision-making in the European Union, The European
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adoption. The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy
and the Committee on Legal Affairs have even reduced the time needed for the
adoption of legislative acts considerably since co-decision was introduced in 1993.
The shift of the EP committees towards legislative power and its effective execution
has led to a significant decrease in the number of non-legislative resolutions, own
initiative reports and resolutions after statements or urgencies (from 455 in 1986 to
168 in 1998).
40 Own initiative reports and urgency resolutions reflect the individual
and political awareness and interests of MEPs in publicising an issue for the EU
citizens and for the electorate.
2.4. The Role of EP Committees in Implementation
Another important issue is the process of implementing legislation. EP committees
play only a marginal role in comitology procedures. As effective co-legislator, the EP
demands an equal right to the Council in controlling the implementation process.
The respective agreements
41 which the Parliament negotiated with the Commission
and the Council provided, inter alia, a mechanism by which the EP committees are
informed of draft implementing measures relating to their competence by the
Commission and by which they also have to be consulted by the Council.
42 Apart
from this mechanism the Commission had to – according to the modus vivendi –
“take account as far as possible of any comments by the European Parliament and had
to keep it informed at every stage of the procedure.”
The agreements neither guaranteed that Parliament’s view would be taken into
account, nor allow Parliament real influence over the content of implementing
legislation.
43 As a consequence the EP has made the decision about the type of
implementing procedure, a central issue in conciliation.
44 The Intergovernmental
Conference of 1996 was supposed to solve the conflict over comitology but it failed to
do so, as it only called upon the Commission
45 to submit a proposal to the Council for
the revision and updating of the procedures as regards the exercise of implementing
powers conferred on the Commission (Comitology Decision of 1987).
46
                                                
40 Maurer, Andreas (1999): op. cit., p. 33ff.
41  “Samland-Williamson Agreement” of September 1996, (concluded by the Chairman of the EP
Budget Committee, Detlev Samland and the former General Secretary of the Commission, David
Williamson, OJ C 347, 1996, p. 134),
Modus vivendi between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission of December 1994,
OJ C 102 1996, p. 1f;
“Plumb-Delors Agreement” of March 1988 concluded by the former President of the European
Commission, Jacques Delors, and the former President of the European Parliament, Lord Plumb,
Conference of Committee Chairmen, PE 212.909, 7.7.1995.
42 The EP has to be consulted whenever a draft general implementing act is referred to it as a result of a
negative, or no, opinion from the committee.
43 Bradley, Kieran (1998): Institutional Aspects of Comitology: Scenes from the Cutting Room Floor,
mimeo, p. 5.
44 Bradley, Kieran (1997) “The European Parliament and Comitology: On the Road to Nowhere, in,
European Law Journal, vol. 3, No. 3, 1998, p. 230-254
45 Declaration No. 31 annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference.
46 The Council had laid down the procedures in Council Decision 87/373/EEC of 13 July (OJ L 197,
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The Commission put forward its proposal in June 1998 and the Council adopted a
new Comitology Decision on 28 June 1999.
47 This decision provides for a (limited)
involvement of the EP as regards to acts adopted by co-decision. It meets the demand
of the EP for a "protection of the legislative sphere"
48, but rejects far-reaching
demands that the EP should be placed on an equal footing the Council.
49
The Commission and the EP have subsequently concluded an agreement for
implementing the Comitology Decision of 1999, which gives the EP the following
rights:
•   It is to be informed by the Commission on a regular basis about ‘comitology’
procedures. To that end, it is to receive, at the same time as the members of the
committees and on the same terms, the draft agendas for committee meetings,
the draft measures submitted to the committees for the implementation of
basic instruments adopted by the co-decision procedure, and the results of
voting and summary records of the meetings and lists of the authorities to
which the persons designated by the Member States to represent them belong.
•   Furthermore, the Commission agrees to forward to the European Parliament,
for information, at the request of the parliamentary committee responsible,
specific draft measures for implementing basic instruments not adopted under
the co-decision  procedure but which are of particular importance to the
European Parliament. Pursuant to the judgment of the Court of First Instance
of the European Communities of 19 July 1999
50 the European Parliament may
request access to minutes of committee meetings. Once the appropriate
technical arrangements have been made, the documents referred to in Article
7(3) of the Comitology Decision will be forwarded electronically. Confidential
documents will be processed in accordance with internal administrative
procedures drawn up by each institution with a view to providing all the
requisite guarantees.
•   According to Article 8 of the new Comitology Decision, the European
Parliament may indicate, in a resolution setting out the grounds on which it is
based, that draft measures for implementing a basic instrument adopted by the
procedure provided for under the co-decision procedure exceed  the
implementing powers provided for in that basic instrument. The European
Parliament is to adopt such resolutions in plenary; it is to have a period of one
month in which to do so, beginning on the date of receipt of the final draft of
the implementing measures in the language versions submitted to the
                                                
47 Council Decision of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing
powers conferred on the Commission (OJ L 184, 17.7.1999, p. 23-26).
48 See opinion of EP in: OJ C 279/258, p. 404, 411.
49 For a detailed analysis see: Haibach, Georg (1999): Council Decision 1999/468 – A New
Comitology Decision for the 21
st Century!?, in: Eipascope, No. 1999/3, pp. 10-18.
50 Case T-188/97, Rothmans v Council© EIPA May 2000 16
Commission.
51 Following adoption by the European Parliament of a
resolution, the Member of the Commission responsible is to inform Parliament
or, where appropriate, the parliamentary committee responsible, of the action
the Commission intends to take.
This new agreement, which replaces the 1988 Plumb/Delors agreement, the 1996
Samland/Williamson agreement and the 1994 modus vivendi, aims to streamline and
simplify for the EP the process of controlling the implementing powers conferred on
the Commission. The EP committees will inter alia be responsible to check the draft
measures as to whether they exceed the implementing powers provided for in the
basic instrument, adopted under the co-decision procedure. This will increase the
workload for the committees significantly if this is to be done systematically and on a
regular basis. The committees are to be informed more comprehensively than under
the various inter-institutional agreements and that this is to be done via email is an
innovation that will hopefully simplify the forwarding of documents.
This survey conducted on the existing body of knowledge on the EP has shown that
most general books on the EU, and especially the ones dealing with its institutional
system include a chapter on the EP. Corbett, Jacobs, Shackleton (1995) and Westlake
(1994) provide a very comprehensive overview of the EP. Maurer (1998 and 1999)
has conducted extensive research on the EP in general and its decision procedures in
particular. Authors such as Bradley (1997) and Hummer (1998) have analysed the role
of the EP in the implementing process.
The literature focusing on the standing committees of the EP is very limited. , It
consists, for the most part, of a short, descriptive analysis of these committees within
the general context of the EP. Little empirical evidence is available on how EP
committees work and the role they play within the whole process of EU-decision
making.
2.5. Approach, Questions and Methodology
2.5.1. Major Research Questions
The basic questions to be addressed by this subproject are:
•   Is the work of EP committees determined more by political factors or technical
expertise? What is the role of "democratic values" (i.e. transparency,
openness) vis-à-vis the need to be efficient?
•   Do they derive their legitimacy by being efficient and effective?
•   Does this committee system weaken the bond to the voter, because less time is
spent in constituencies?
                                                
51 In urgent cases, and in the case of measures relating to day-to-day administrative matters and/or
having a limited period of validity, the time-limit will be shorter. That time-limit may be very short in
extremely urgent cases (in particular on public health grounds). The Member of the Commission
responsible is to set the appropriate time-limit and state the reason for that time-limit.© EIPA May 2000 17
The research will be carried out in the form of case studies designed to trace and
analyse the negotiations process as regards to three legislative acts from each of the
following selected policy areas. These policy areas are politically highly sensitive for
the citizens of the European Union and have been at the centre of European political
debate:
•   environment;
•   culture;
•   research and development and telecommunications; including the
liberalisation of the electricity market;
•   social affairs;
•   internal market.
Within each sector, three legislative acts will be selected in cooperation with
subproject 2 on working groups in Council. In a first step an effort will be made to
answer the following questions through the analysis of documents:
-  The attribution of a specific act to a specific EP committee: does it always depend
on the issue in question (e.g. environment) or is it in some cases a political
decision? Is this question at all an issue within the EP or just a matter of routine?
-  The members of these committees and their role: Are they technical experts or
"fullblood politians"? What is it that "counts and matters", is it technical expertise
or political standing? How are rapporteurs chosen? Are they "mandate free
agents" or do they act on behalf of their party, their country or their constituency?
- The role of the EP committee in the EP decision process: What are the
competences of the respective committee as laid down in the EP rules of
procedure? What happened to the result of the committee deliberations in the
course of the EU-decision making process? This question will be analysed from
two angles:
a) contribution of EP committees to the legislative process: How well do they
"pre-cook" what is passed in plenary? How important are reports put forward
by committees?
b) interaction with Council working groups: Are political or technical issues on
the agenda? How does this interaction with the Members of Council working
groups differ from committee to committee?
-  Controlling powers of the respective EP committee in the implementing phase: Is
the comitology question on the agenda of the committee? Does it table resolutions,
make use of its possibilities according to the new inter-institutional agreement?
In a second step structured interviews, divided into two stages, will be conducted with
members of the respective committees and their staff, for which six respondents will
be chosen from each committee. This means that about 30 interviews will have to be
conducted.
-  Stage 1 will concentrate on answering open questions that we were not able to get
answers to through the documentary analysis
-  Stage 2 will address more fundamental issues such as how do members of
committees and their staff view their role in the legislative process and what is
their view on the issue of comitology?© EIPA May 2000 18
2.5.1.1. Draft Interview and Documentary Analysis Guide
Three sets of questions, which are co-ordinated with subproject 2 on Council working
groups, are part of this draft interview guide. These standard sets of questions need, of
course, to be adapted to each case study and person to be interviewed.
A.  The state of play at the beginning of a EP's committee activity on a legislative
proposal
-  Why was this issue delegated to a specific EP committee?
-  Were several committees responsible and why?
-  Who are the members of the committee and how were the selected? How was the
rapporteur chosen?
B.  How was the proposal dealt with in a committee?
-  Did committee members have different positions on the issue (shaped for example
by party clevages)?
-  Was (technical) expertise integrated from "outside" the committee (e.g. hearings
of independent experts)?
-  What was the role of the Commission and the Council at this stage of the decision
making process?
C.  Output and effects of the EP committee deliberations
-  Did the result of the committee deliberations meet with reservations from plenary,
if so why? How were this problems resolved, i.e. why could they not be resolved?
-  Interaction with Council working groups: were issues on the agenda more of a
technical or political nature? Did the proposed measures put forward by the EP
committee meet with reservations from members of the Council working groups
and if so how were they resolved?
-  Did the committee make use of its controlling powers in the implementation
phase?© EIPA May 2000 19
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3.1. Introduction
The point of departure for this part of our project is that the existing body of
knowledge about the Council's working groups is relatively weak. More precisely, as
we highlight in section 1, most research on these groups is descriptive and highly
general. Nevertheless, this work has thrown up a number of explicit and implicit
hypotheses that our research could usefully develop and test. In similar fashion, more
general approaches to EU decision-making all implicitly make assumptions about, and
provide some insights into, the role played by working groups. For this reason in
section 2 we have set out what we consider each theory of decision-making would
hypothesize about working groups if it were to be applied to the subject of our
research. The ideas thrown up by these two types of bibliographical resources are
subsequently brought together in section 3 where we attempt to develop our own
approach to the study of working groups. Particular stress is laid here upon the
research methodology we intend to adopt, our choice of case studies and questions
which will be used to structure our interview guides and documentary analysis. A
final section lists in separate categories all the bibliographical references quoted in
this paper. Given the preliminary nature of this document, it is important to underline
that it's content has not been driven by a wish to "academicize" our research project.
On the contrary, the primary function of the references to existing research made here
is to build a solid framework for our empirical investigations and thus ensure that the
line of questioning adopted does not simply end up "putting new wine in old bottles".
3.2. Existing Knowledge about the Working Groups
To our knowledge, Beyers and Diericks (1997, 1998) have undertaken the only
research specifically targeted on the Council's working groups. This material is a
valuable asset for our own project, but suffers from being used to test an excessively
binary comparision between supranational and intergovernmental theories of
European integration (see section 2)
29. In reading the rest of what has thus far been
written about the Council's working groups, we are struck by a paradox. On the one
hand, it is generally assumed that these bodies play a very important role in the
legislative process by preparing COREPER and Council meetings. Impressive figures
are put forward to support this idea (Westlake, 1995). It is generally acknowledged
that there are more than 200 working groups which all together hold more than 2,500
meetings each year. Some scholars go even further in estimating that 70% of the
agreements reached in Council are actually decided upon at the level of working
groups. On the other hand, this literature provides little information about the
decision-making processes within working groups. In particular, existing studies
rarely distinguish between detailed "technical" decisions and political ones, thus
rendering the above-mentioned figures less meaningful (Van Den Bos, 1998). A brief
look at the literature on other EU committees (1.1) and on the workings of the Council
                                                
29 In our view, Beyers and Diericks’ research design suffers from a number of flaws. First, it
concentrates on “ communication  networks ” between working group members rather than on the
decision-making process itself. Second, it concentrates on staff in the permanent representations rather
than on this population and national civil servants from the capitals. Finally, by choosing quantitative
analysis rather than detailed case studies, this research tells us little about the effects of working group
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as a whole (1.2) provide us with some questions with which to start such qualitative
research.
3.2.1. Knowledge of other EU Committees
Over the last few years, research has begun to look in detail at the EU decision-
making process. At least three types of approach to the role of committees in this
process are useful for our purposes:
-  a law-making approach has looked in particular at the role of the EU treaties in
institutionalizing the role of committees (Haibach, 1997; Joerges & Neyer, 1997;
Voz, 1997).
-  a focus on the normative implications of using committees to make decisions offers
a
constant reminder that these bodies can sometimes be considered to act anti-
democratically (Dehousse, 1998 ; Dogan, 1997; Steunenberg, 1996).
- finally, a more empirically-driven approach has looked in detail at how different
committees shape the final decisions made by the EU (Pedler & Schaefer, 1996).
Focusing in particular upon the comitology committees, much attention has been
paid here to the various processes linked to the amendment (or non amendment) of
legislation that takes place between an initial Council decision and the final
product (European Parliament deliberations, European Commission and Council
committee reactions etc.).
From their respective angles, these three types of research throw up at least four sets
of questions which merit reformulating and addressing in our research:
•   how and when are working groups and their agendas set up? Who decides which
working group will deal with which issue? Are working groups permanent or
temporary? How often do the civil servants who come to working group meetings
change?
•   the room for autonomy given to national government representatives in the
working groups. How detailed are the instructions given to these agents? What
room for manoeuvre do they have to actually negotiate and compromise their own
initial positions during and between group meetings?
•   what forms of cooperation arise within each group? Are these essentially fleeting
agreements on very specific issues or more long-term alliances based on common
perceptions of the issue area as a whole?
•   how are meetings run and compromises brokered? how influential is the Council
Presidency? what role is given to the Council's secretariat? how do Commission
officials play their hand in working groups?
Working on the general hypothesis that there is likely to be considerable difference
between the practices of each working group on these four points, we need to try to
establish variables which explain such differences. For example, are they essentially
attributable to the nature of each policy area (a functionalist hypothesis) or is
difference better explained by retracing the emergence of each working group and its© EIPA May 2000 25
standard procedures (neo-institutionalist hypothesis)? These points will be addressed
more systematically in section 2.© EIPA May 2000 26
3.2.2 Knowledge about the Council as a Whole
Before proceeding to this stage, it is important to recall that the hypothesis of
"variable geometry" within EU decision-making has also been developed at the level
of the Council of Ministers as a whole. As any student of the EU knows, there is not
one Council but many sectoral permutations of this body. Over time, different
Councils tend to develop different approaches to decision-making (Hayes Renshaw &
Wallace, 1995; 1997) which logically have an impact upon the way working groups
become established and operate. In order to take this general idea further, however,
the existing literature on the Council encourages us to look at three points in
particular.
- the link between the European Council, the Council of General Affairs and each
sectoral council. It is generally accepted that the European Council can determine
which Council deals with an issue and the “ mandate ” it has to produce legislation.
But how do these matters work out in practice? Does the Council of General
affairs, for example, simply enact the European Council's declarations or does it
interpret them and thus guide which Council (and therefore which working group)
deals with what?
- what is the relationship between COREPER and the working groups? Again, the
literature tends to stress the importance of COREPER in the shaping and taking of
EU decisions (Lewis, 1998). However, does each working group have the same
relationship to COREPER?
- the effects of the temporary nature of the Council Presidency. The fact that this
changes every six months is a distinctive characteristic of the EU. Some authors
argue that its relative brevity weakens the role of the Presidency as regards
decision-making, whereas others conclude that on the contrary this role is often
vital (Wurzel, 1996). Both hypotheses could usefully be tested by our research.
Obviously much more could be said about both the research on other EU Committees
and on the Council as a whole. For our purposes, however, the questions raised by
both strands of research are more important than their detailed conclusions. These
questions will now be refined by looking at the different ways in which theories of
European integration would tend to translate them into testable hypotheses.
3.3. What can General Approaches to EU Decision-Making lead us to
hypothesize about Working Groups?
Although nearly all EU scholars have never systematically studied the role of the
Council's working groups, it would be foolhardy to cut our own research off from the
rich vein of ideas about the EU's decision-making processes present in more general
theories. Taking the perhaps unusual step of hypothesizing what five such theories
would hypothesize about working groups if their respective authors set out to do so,
the purpose of this section is to ally deductive reasoning to the inductively produced
knowledge summarized in section 1.© EIPA May 2000 27
3.3.1 Intergovernmentalism: Working Groups as Fora for National Delegates
Although a distinction should be made between classical intergovernmentalist
approaches to the EU (Hoffman, 1993) and more "liberal" ones (Moravsik, 1998a, b
& c), the basic argument put forward by this research tradition is that the EU is an
arena dominated by national governments. More precisely, such authors downplay the
role of the Commission and of transnational interest groups while stressing instead the
influence of national interest groups and the interests of national governments.
Together, in each Member State, the relationship between the latter two types of
actors determines national positions as regards proposals for EU legislation and
policy. During negotiations, these national positions translate into potentially
powerful resources for Ministers and their civil servants because of the nature of the
Council's voting procedures. If one follows the logic of this argument, three
hypotheses could be made about the Council's working groups:
- representatives of national governments arrive with stable and clear negotiation
positions and strategies. Instructions to the civil servants concerned are detailed
and all compromises are only reached after agreement between the ministries and
interest groups involved in each national capital.
- because each national government possesses considerable resources of policy
expertise (Moravsik, 1998c), working groups just provide them with a means to
supplement their information about the negotiating stances of other governments.
As such these groups just "lubricate" the making of EU decisions, they do not
shape them.
- the brokering of compromises is essentially carried out through the formation of
temporary agreements between representatives of national governments. There is
thus only a minor role for longstanding alliances at this level. Similarly,
Commission and Council Secretariat officials only act as facilitators of decision
making; they do not influence the outcome of negotiations.
To sum up, such an approach has the advantage of being clearcut and developing
testable hypotheses. However, as it postulates that differences between working
groups would be minor, or more precisely insignificant, finer approaches to decision-
making need to be used to delve deeper.
3.3.2 Neofunctionalism: Working Groups as Vectors of Transnationalism
The traditional opponent of intergovermentalist visions of European integration is
neofunctionalism. Developed initially in the 1950s and 1960s (Haas, 1958; Lindberg,
1963; Lindberg & Sheingold, 1970), this approach essentially sees integration as a
transnational process driven by increasing contact between economic and political
actors from each of the Member States. Such interdependence has taken the form of
European-level trade associations and interest groups on the one hand, and European-
minded institutions on the other. From this perspective, at least two hypotheses on the
nature of working groups would be made© EIPA May 2000 28
-  whilst ostensibly engaged in intergovernmental bargaining, all EU committees are
at the
same time arenas where actors from each Member State are progressively
socialized into developing common viewpoints and accepting common ways of
reaching decisions. Consequently the stability over time of group membership
would be postulated, together with the idea that in reality individual civil servants
going to Brussels have considerable leeway to bargain and thus modify their own
government's initial position.
- a second point crucial to neofunctionalist analysis concerns the impact of new
decision-making procedures in one sector upon other sectors of the economy and
polity. Formalized in the concept of "spillover", we would therefore expect
proponents of this theory to hypothesize considerable homogeneity between the
practices and priorities of different working groups. Any difference observed
would be attributable to the functional specificites of the part of the economy dealt
with by the working groups concerned.
The neofunctionalist approach has the advantage of beginning to think about the way
decisions are not just taken but how they are shaped prior to this final act. However,
again the question of variation between working groups would end up being dealt
with in broad-brush terms by research that only uses such an approach.
3.3.3 Policy-Making or Governance: Working Groups as Arenas of
Interdependence
Frustrated by the breadth of the conclusions of the two previous "schools", over the
1970s and 1980s emerged a third approach to European integration based on sectoral
case studies of public policy-making (Wallace, 1985; Mazey & Richardson, 1992;
Richardson, 1996; Peterson & Bomberg, 1999) and governance (Kohler-Koch, 1996;
Armstrong & Bulmer, 1998). Although little of this research has focused specifically
upon the inner workings of the Council, logically it would throw up two hypotheses to
explain the functioning of working groups.
- policy is essentially formulated in situations of uncertainty. Actors do not enter EU
negotiations with fixed preferences and negotiating strategies. Rather they
participate in an iterative process that shapes EU legislation by implicitly arriving
at a common view on the form and intensity of EU intervention used to design a
policy. In other words policy-making is more about European-level collective
learning and adaptation than straightforward confrontations between cost-benefit
driven positions established at the level of the nation state.
- despite the transnational character of this process, however, national negotiating
styles remain highly important. Moreover, no automatic process of spillover from
one sector to another is likely to occur. The working practices of each committee
can only be analyzed on the basis of its own particular history.
Like all inductive approaches to politics, public policy or governance approaches to
EU decision-making often have trouble identifying variables for comparison and for
the identification of reasons for difference. In short, the danger is one of "all study and© EIPA May 2000 29
no case". Nevertheless, as this tradition of research is also based upon rigorous
qualitative research methods, its implicit hypotheses need taking seriously.
3.3.4 Neo-Institutionalism: Working Groups as Rule-Bound Institutions
Rigorous methodology is also a hallmark of neo-institutionalist approaches to EU
decision-making which have sought to build upon observations made by policy
specialists in order to propose a deductive explanatory theory. The general argument
made here is that the orientation of decision-making in the EU is systematically
influenced by the presence of institutionalized norms, rules and procedures (Bulmer,
1998; Pierson, 1996; Pollack, 1996; Sandholtz, 1996; Stone & Sandholtz, 1997).
These norms create “ paths ” where certain types of ideas and interests are favoured.
From this perspective, committees such as working groups are given considerable
importance. Applied to working groups they implicitly generate two hypotheses:
- each working group has a set of standard procedures that have developed over
time. These sets of rules structure not only the ways decisions are taken, but the
types of policy outcome that is produced (eg. regulatory-type policies rather than
redistributive ones). Although some variation between working groups is to be
expected (for reasons of "path dependence"), the formal rules that apply to all such
groups mean that a single general pattern of behaviour is probable.
- spillover from one working group is not due to socialisation or economic
determinism. Rather rules that have been successful in one sector are tried in
others. By locking in behaviour, these rules in turn produce decision-making norms
that transfer from one sector to another through precise and identifiable inter-
sectoral negotiations. The processes which established and institutionalized these
rules and norms thus provide the key to understanding both the specificity of each
working group and what makes them different. Particular attention thus needs
paying to the role of co-ordinating bodies, particularly the General Secretariat of
the Council Secretariat.© EIPA May 2000 30
3.3.5 Constructivism: Working Groups as Shapers of "European Problems"
The goal of constructivist approaches to politics is less to decide which institution
dominates EU decision-making (still the goal of neo-institutionalism), and more to
discover how policy problems and public interventions (or "solutions") are
constructed over time and impact upon the question "who gets what?" (Checkel, 1997;
Ruggie, 1998; JEPP, 1999). The central premiss of this approach is that public
problems are not simply elements of a society that malfunction. Rather in each society
a problem is taken on by public actors (and thus rendered "public") because their very
legitimacy depends upon them at least appearing to structure its very definition
(Muller, 1995). For this reason attention is not only placed upon the negotiating
procedures which shape public decision-making, but great weight is given to
analyzing the cognitive and emotive processes which have been at work prior to such
negotiations. For example, European agricultural policy is seen as not just determined
by today’s interest groups and public authorities, but by a representation of farming
which precludes simply subsidizing intensive and large scale production in favour of
efforts (which are not always successful) to save “ the family farm ”. A more radical
version of this research tradition stresses the role of imbalanced power relations
within each society in influencing these processes (Bigo, 1997). In this way, particular
emphasis is placed upon the social, cultural and therefore historical genesis of a public
problem.
This approach has rarely been systematically applied to the study of European
decision-making. However, in conducting research into the emergence of "European
problems", constructivists would logically seek to test the following hypotheses.
- the positions expressed by national civil servants in working groups are the fruit of
long processes of negotiation a) within each Member State; b) between the
Member States. These processes have progressively defined a problem in such a
way that certain forms of public intervention are ruled out right from the start (eg.
massive EU redistributive payments) whereas other forms are "ruled in" (e.g.
"cheap" regulatory measures).
- the definition of European public problems cannot be isolated from the impact of
other international fora for debate on public policy orientations (eg. the OECD).
Research must therefore also tackle the work done by national and international
experts before working groups of the Council meet to try to formulate their
decisions and recommendations.
To sum up, the constructivist case is centred more on the "shaping of problems" and
its impact upon decisions, than on just the processes that "shape decisions".
Evidently this exercise of deducing hypotheses from general theories could be
extended. No doubt we will come back to these reflections when we try to interpret
our own empirical material. In order first to collect it, the objective now is to clarify
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3.4. Our Approach, Questions and Methodology
Ultimately, our research project can be boiled down to the two-sided question "what
do working groups do?" and "why do they differ?". To refine these questions and
translate them into an empirical research programme, the two previous sections have
taken ideas from both inductively and deductively driven studies. It is now time to
synthesize the lessons of this exercise and clearly identify our own research design.
3.4.1 A Set of Competing Hypotheses
Although a table always runs the risk of caricaturing approaches to politics, in these
circumstances, such a risk seems worth taking. Ways of dealing with three sets of
questions are thus compared: the establishment of a working group, what happens
during its procedures, and what happens after it has finished its work on a piece of
legislation.© EIPA May 2000 32
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3.4.2 Research Methods, Case Studies and Interview Guide
In order to test these hypotheses, we have chosen a number of case studies and
developed a draft interview and documentary analysis guide.
The case studies
We will collect and study the negotiation of three pieces of legislation for the
following five different policy areas. These areas have been chosen for their mode of
decision in the Council (qualified majority voting -QMV-or unanimity-U) and
because of the different policy rationales used to justify a European level of
intervention:
- telecommunications (QMV) as an example of the completion of the single market;
- environment (QMV), an accompanying regulatory-type mode of intervention;
- research and development (QMV) as an accompanying redistributive-type policy;
- social affairs (U) as a contested set of accompanying regulations;
- culture (U) as measures designed to deal with international competition whilst
asserting the EU’s specificities.© EIPA May 2000 33
Within each sector, we will choose our three case studies by identifying from
documents and with the help of officials in COREPER and/or the Council Secretariat:
- the arrival of this issue upon the Council's agenda
- the attribution of this issue to a working group (and what alternatives were
implicitly ruled out...)
- the initial membership and mandate of the working group
- what the working group produced on this issue (a decision, a recommendation)
- what happened to this output over the course of the rest of the EU decision-making
process?
For each sector we anticipate undertaking between 15 and 20 interviews covering:
- representatives of the Permanent representations and of national representations
who worked on these issues in working groups;
- 5 Member States (chosen to reflect a balance between large/small, unitary/federal,
North-South): France, UK, Belgium, Spain, Italy;
- representatives of the Presidency at that time;
- staff, functionaires, officials from the Council secretariat and the Commission.
Draft interview and documentary analysis guide
Three clusters of question structure this draft interview guide. This guide should be
seen as a standard set of questions which naturally needs to be adapted to each
sectoral case study and according to the role of the person being interviewed.
A. The state of play at the beginning of a working group's activity on a "decision"
How did an initial definition of the problem arise?
- when and who pushed for it to be on the Council's agenda? (Commission,
European Council, Presidency, etc...)
- what form did the "problem" take at this stage?
How was the problem designated to a Council working group?
- Role of General Secretariat
- which Council delegated it?
- did a sub- committee intervene before or simultaneously?
- was the working group already set up? ("a standing group") or was it dealt with by
a more ad hoc body? ("working party).
- who were the members of this group? (which ministry, stability over time, etc...)
- which actors from the Commission and the Council secretariat were involved?
B. How was the problem and the decision shaped by the working group?
What were the initial positions of the Member States and the Commission?
- was the mandate of the group seen as clear?
- did national government representatives already appear to have fixed positions? If
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What were the positions of the members of the group as its proceedings progressed?
- did their instructions from their home civil service appear to change?
- did their behaviour within the group change?
- did the problem as a whole take on a new definition that required changes in
positions?
Who participated in brokering the final deal?
- what role did the Presidency (and/or the Troika) play?
- how did the Commission's agents modify their text and behaviour?
- role of actors with specific interest or of Member State that « pushed » issue
C. Output and effects of the working group's deliberations
What type of recommendation was produced by the group?
- a clear COREPER “ I point ” recommendation (no debate in COREPER needed)
- a COREPER “ II point ” recommendation (debate needed on certain points)
What happened in COREPER and in Council?
- legislation passed without problems
- issues referred back to the Working group
Implementation and feedback
- was there any opposition to the working groups definition of the problem and the
decision at the Comitology and EP Committee stage?
- has implementing this decision posed any particular difficulties in the Member
States?© EIPA May 2000 35
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4. Subproject 3: Policy Implementation and Comitology Committees
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4.1. Introduction
The vast majority of legal acts in the European Community are not enacted by the
legislative authorities (Council and European Parliament), but by the European
Commission.
30 Most of them are adopted by the Commission after the Council has
conferred implementation powers on the Commission and a so-called “comitology”
committee, composed of civil servants of the Member States, has given its opinion on
a proposal by the Commission. Although among these legal acts there are many
“routine” measures, decisions with an enormous political and economic importance
such as the embargo against British beef in connection with the BSE crisis in 1996
31
are also taken according to comitology procedures.
The first comitology committees were established in the early 1960s when the
Council recognised that it lacked the resources to make all the necessary
implementation rules in the first agricultural market regimes. However, it did not want
to delegate the implementation powers to the Commission without keeping some
control. The committees – which have differing legal “weights” depending on the type
of committee – have the task to give an opinion on an implementation measure
proposed by the Commission before the Commission can adopt it.
The procedures for adopting EC implementing measures have been criticised ever
since these procedures were set up in the early 1960s.
32 Many suggestions and
proposals have been made to ensure that decisions of a legislative nature or with
significant budgetary implications are made following the regular EC legislative
process,
33 i.e. proposed by the Commission and enacted by the Council either in
consultation, co-operation or co-decision with the European Parliament.
The line that separates routine implementing measures from those with legislative and
budgetary implications is, however, rather blurred and difficult to draw. The Treaty
does not specify how detailed legislative acts must be or how much discretion the
Council can delegate to the Commission in its transfer of implementing powers
34.
This question in the last analysis has to be answered by the European Court of Justice.
                                                
30 In 1996 the European Commission adopted - in addition to numerous decisions - 2,341 regulations
and 2,806 directives (being legal acts with general application), whereas the Council adopted 484 legal
acts in total (European Commission, General Report on the Activities of the European Union, 1996,
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1997, p. 424, 426). For a comprehensive
statistical overview see: Falke, Komitologie - Entwicklung, Rechtsgrundlagen und erste empirische
Annäherung, in: Das Ausschußwesen der Europäischen Union, Joerges/Falke, Baden-Baden, 2000, p.
43, 44-49.
31 Commission Decision 96/239/EC of 27 March 1996 on emergency measures to protect against
bovine spongiform encephalopathy, [1996] OJ L 78/47. See for a detailed analysis: Falke, Komitologie
- Entwicklung, Rechtsgrundlagen und erste empirische Annäherung, in: Das Ausschußwesen der
Europäischen Union, Joerges/Falke, Baden-Baden, 2000, p. 43, 117-135.
32 Cp. e.g. Trotman, Agricultural Policy Management: A Lesson in Unaccountability, Common Market
Law Review 1995, p.1385; Blumann/Adam, La politique agricole commune dans la tourmente: la crise
de la “vache folle”, Revue trimestrielle de droit europeen 1997, p. 239.
33 See e.g. the European Parliament´s Resolution of 14 November 1996 on the Commission report
pursuant to Article 189b(8) of the EC Treaty on the scope of the codecision procedure (SEC(96)1225 -
C4-0464/96), OJ [1996] C 362/267.
34 Falke, Komitologie - Entwicklung, Rechtsgrundlagen und erste empirische Annäherung, in: Das
Ausschußwesen der Europäischen Union, Joerges/Falke, Baden-Baden, 2000, p. 43, 53.© EIPA May 2000 41
In a series of decisions the Court has left it basically to the legislator to allocate the
powers between the legislator and the executive.
35
In cases where the Council legislates alone (consultative procedure), it is for the
Council to decide the content of the basic act and the scope of the powers to be
delegated to the Commission. The Council has tended to be rather generous in
conferring implementing powers to the Commission since it can control the
Commission through comitology committees. Since the Court has been rather
reluctant to interfere in that choice, the Council enjoys practically complete freedom
in that respect. Drawing the line between legislative and implementing acts has
become almost an entirely political issue.
36
Whereas the Council and the Commission
37 have no principle objections to this
situation, the European Parliament which has no influence on the committee
procedures wants to restrict the delegation of implementing measures to purely
routine matters. This is the root of the conflict between Council and Parliament.
38 In
cases where the co-decision procedure applies, the European Parliament and the
Council have to find a compromise as to what is decided in the legislative act and
what in the implementing act. The new comitology decision of 28 June 1999
39 has not
                                                
35 The landmark case in this respect is Case 25/70, Einfuhrstelle v. Köster, [1970] ECR 1161, where the
Court decided that “it is sufficient ... that the basic elements of the matter to be dealt with have been
adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down (by the Treaty). On the other hand, the provisions
implementing the basic regulations may be adopted according to a (different) procedure, either by the
Council itself or by the Commission by virtue of an authorisation complying with Article 155”. In fact,
the European Court of Justice has, however, never annulled an implementing measure because of the
fact that it dealt with basic elements of a specific subject matter.
See also Case 23/75, Rey Soda v Cassa Conguaglio Zucchero, [1975] ECR 1279, in which the Court
confirmed that in the context of the Common Agricultural Policy the Council may confer “wide
powers” on the Commission. In Case 29-77, SA Roquette Frères v France, [1977] ECR 1835, the Court
ruled that whenever the “evaluation of a complex economic situation is involved, the Commission and
the management committee enjoy, in this respect, a wide measure of discretion”.
36 Falke, Komitologie - Entwicklung, Rechtsgrundlagen und erste empirische Annäherung, in: Das
Ausschußwesen der Europäischen Union, Joerges/Falke, Baden-Baden, 2000, p. 43, 55 mentions two
directives in similar fields as examples to illustrate this: Council Directive 67/548/EEC of 27 June 1967
on the approximation of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the classification,
packaging and labelling of dangerous substances, [1967] OJ L 196/1 until 1999 had been amended 8
times using a legislative procedure, but it also has been adapted to technical progress 25 times using
comitology procedures. On the other hand, Council Directive 76/769/EEC of 27 July 1976 on the
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to
restrictions on the marketing and use of certain dangerous substances and preparations, [1976] OJ L
262/201 has always been amended in legislative procedures (14 times by 1994), although also in the
case of this directive the necessity to take quick action would often have required the possibility to
adopt implementing acts in order to avoid the lenghty legislative procedures.
37 See e.g. Schmitt von Sydow in: Groeben/Thiesing/Ehlermann/Schmitt von Sydow, Kommentar zum
EU-/EG-Vertrag, Art. 155, para. 76 who – summarising his experiences from working in the
Commission for decades – is of the opinion that “in practice the management and regulatory
committees have proven to be better than any academic definition of the borderline between technical
implementation and political decisions; the negative opinion of a committee rings an alarm clock which
indicates the existence of political problems to the Council and authorizes it to intervene”.
38 See for more details of this “power struggle”: Haibach, The History of Comitology, in: M. Andeans,
A. Türk, Delegated Legislation and the Role of Committees in the EC, Kluwer Law International, 2000.
39 Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of
implementing powers conferred on the Commission, [1999] OJ L 184/23.© EIPA May 2000 42
contributed to resolving the question of what must to be decided in a legislative or in
an implementation procedure
40.
4.2. Objectives and Research Questions
The research questions to be addressed by this subproject should contribute to a
constructive solution to this important issue of the institutional balance by first
establishing criteria for an operational demarcation between legislative and
implementing measures, and secondly by assessing a large number of EC
implementing acts to determine whether and in which cases implementing measures
have in fact violated the prerogatives of the legislators Council and Parliament. The
subproject therefore concentrates on the following questions:
Subproject 3a):
-  How can the line that separates implementing measures from those with
legislative implications be drawn?
-  How can that differentiation between legislative and implementing legal acts be
made operational?
-  How could an effective system of control be established that limits the
implementing powers of the Commission and safeguards the prerogatives of the
legislators, especially Parliament?
Subproject 3b):
-  Have the prerogatives of the legislative authorities been generally respected in
implementing decisions in the course of the past years or have decisions with
important legislative implications been decided upon according to comitology
procedures?
-  In which policy arenas has this primarily occurred?
-  In what way have these possible “transgressions” affected the institutional
balance?
The allocation of law-making powers between the institutions is not determined with
sufficient clarity by the Treaty or for that purpose by the Court. Before one can
answer the questions posed in subproject 3b), as to when the prerogatives of the
legislative authorities have been violated, it is first necessary to solve the theoretical
problem of what these prerogatives consist of. In other words it has first to be clarified
where the dividing line between legislative and implementing powers should be
drawn before attempting to decide whether implementing decisions have strayed into
the field reserved to the legislative authorities.
Subproject 3a) has the task to develop operational criteria to distinguish between
legislative and implementing powers. As outlined in more detail below in section C, it
will begin with analysing how the EC Treaty deals with the issue of how legislative
and implementing powers should be allocated to the institutions. It will secondly
examine to what extent the EC legal system is based on a hierarchy of norms and will
                                                
40 Falke, Komitologie - Entwicklung, Rechtsgrundlagen und erste empirische Annäherung, in: Das
Ausschußwesen der Europäischen Union, Joerges/Falke, Baden-Baden, 2000, p. 43, 108 expects,
however, that a positive aspect of the new decision will be a more intensive discussion of the scope of
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compare the legal framework of the EC Treaty in this respect with that established in
some of the Member States, including theoretical considerations on which these
systems are based. Third, the role of the Court in interpreting the allocation of
legislative and implementing powers will be examined. These theoretical
considerations should lead in a concluding part to developing a checklist, which can
then be used in subproject 3b).
4.3  Theoretical Approach to Distinguish Between Legislative and Implementing
Powers
4.3.1. The “EC version” of the Principle of Separation of Powers: Art. 7 EC
Treaty
A basic feature of the constitutions of the Member States is the principle of separation
of powers:
-  The 1789 French Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen, to which the
present 1958 Fifth Constitution commits itself in its Preamble, even proclaimed
that “a society where the separation is not established is no society at all”.
-  The 1949 German Grundgesetz establishes, in Art. 20 (2), that “all state authority
shall be exercised by the people through elections and voting and by specific
organs of the legislature, the executive power, and the judiciary”. The principle of
separation of powers is a basic constitutional principle which according to Article
79 (3) of the Grundgesetz cannot be amended.
-  In the unwritten British Constitution the principle also exists, but refers mainly to
the independence of the judiciary, as executive and legislative powers are closely
intermingled.
41
In contrast to this, in the EC Treaty the principle of separation of powers has not been
institutionally manifested and in this form has been expressly  rejected by the
European Court of Justice
42. The respective judgment followed a case in which the
United Kingdom had argued that Directive 80/723/EEC which had been adopted by
the Commission was void because it was “clear from the Treaty provisions governing
the institutions that all original law-making power is vested in the Council, whilst the
Commission has only powers of surveillance and implementation”.
According to the Court of Justice there is, however, “no basis for that argument in the
Treaty provisions governing the institutions”. Article 7 [ex-4] (1) of the Treaty
provides, instead, that “each institution shall act within the limits of the powers
conferred on it by this Treaty”. Referring to Articles 7 [ex-4], 202 [ex-145], 211 [ex-
155] and 249 [ex-189] of the Treaty, the Court ruled that “the limits of the powers
conferred” on an institution “are to be inferred not from a general principle, but from
an interpretation of the particular provision in question”.
                                                
41 Finer et al, Comparing Constitutions, Clarendon Press, 1995, p. 21.
42 Joined Cases 188 to 190/80, France, Italy and United Kingdom v. Commission, [1982] ECR 2545,
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4.3.2 The Hierarchy of Norms in EC law (Primary Law, Basic Acts and
Implementing Acts)
4.3.2.1. Legal Framework
The Treaty provisions do, indeed, not distinguish between legislative, executive and
judicial powers. The Court of Justice has, however, ruled in the Köster case
43 that “the
legislative scheme of the Treaty, and in particular the last paragraph of Article 211
[ex-155], establishes a distinction between the measures directly based on the Treaty
itself and derived law intended to ensure their implementation”. It has been
suggested
44 that
-  measures directly based on the Treaty itself should be considered as legislative
acts,
-  whereas derived law should be seen as executive acts.
 45
Despite the lack of a principle of separation of powers in the conventional sense, the
EC legal system has thus a clear hierarchical structure with three different sets of
rules:
46
-  Primary Law (i.e. the Treaty provisions and general principles of community law)
-  Secondary Law. It can be adopted according to
-  the procedures provided for in the Treaty itself (basic acts) or
-  other procedures (implementing acts).
The existence of this hierarchy of norms in the EC legal system is, however, less
“obvious” than in the legal orders of the Member States: Whereas national
parliaments adopt legislative acts in the form of an “Act” (United Kingdom), a “loi”
(France) or a “Gesetz” (Germany), and governments enact executive acts as an
“Order” or a “Regulation” (United Kingdom), an “ordonnance” ( F r a n c e )  o r  a
“Rechtsverordnung” (Germany), that difference in terminology does not exist in the
EC: Both legislative and executive acts are adopted in the form of regulations and
                                                
43 Case 25/70, Einfuhrstelle v. Köster, [1970] ECR 1161.
44 Lenaerts, Regulating the regulatory process: “delegation of powers” in the European Community,
European Law Review 1993, p. 23.
45 Please note that the European Parliament in its Resolution containing the European Parliament´s
proposals for the Intergovernmental Conference of 13 April 2000 (A5-0086/00, Resolution
Dimitrakopoulos/Leinen) uses a very similar terminology. At 26.2 of the report it proposes to
distinguish between
-  legislative measures (to be adopted by the Council and the European Parliament in the co-decision
procedure) and
-  administrative measures (to be adopted by the European Commission).
46 Bradley Kieran St. Clair, Comitology and the Law: through a glass, darkly, in: Common Market Law
Review 1992, N° 29, pp. 693-721; Haibach, Comitology: A comparative analysis of the separation and
delegation of legislative powers, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 1997, p. 373;
Haibach, Die Rolle von Ausschüssen in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und in der Rechtsprechung des
EuGH, Die Öffentliche Verwaltung 1997, p. 710; Hoffmann, in: Certain Rectangular Problems of
European Integration, Study prepared under the Direction of J.H.H. Weiler, Harvard Law School and
European University Institute, Florence, 1996.© EIPA May 2000 45
directives.
47 Different proposals to introduce a clearer hierarchy of norms in the EC
have not been implemented so far.
48
4.3.2.1.1. Basic Acts
The legislative power (that is the power to enact measures directly based on the
Treaty itself) lies in the EC - depending on the relevant procedure - with the European
Parliament acting jointly with the Council, the Council alone, and - in a two
exceptional cases
49 - with the Commission.
According to Art. 7 EC Treaty, basic acts must have a legal basis in the Treaty.
Furthermore, secondary Community law must not infringe upon the general principles
of community law such as the fundamental rights as provided for in Art. 6 (2) EU
Treaty. The Court of Justice supervises the compliance with these requirements under
procedures such as Art. 230 [ex-173] and 234 [ex-177] EC Treaty which grant the
competence to the court to review the legality of secondary law and annul basic acts
on the ground of infringement of the Treaty.
50
4.3.2.1.2. Implementing Acts
The executive power (that is the power to implement the basic acts) lies - as far as the
Community executes its legislation itself, and not the Member States - with the
Council which, however, according to Article 202 [ex-145] EC Treaty must confer it
to the Commission and may reserve the right to exercise directly implementing
powers itself only in specific cases.
For implementing acts the same principles apply as for basic acts: They have to
comply with the basic act which delegates implementation competences, and the
implementing acts must not go beyond the limits of the delegation.
51 Implementing
measures must thus respect the basic instruments which they apply, execute or
specify. If they fail to do so, the Court of Justice has the power to annul them on the
ground of lack of competence.
                                                
47 See Art. 249 [189] EC Treaty: “… in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, the European
Parliament acting jointly with the Council, the Council and the Commission shall make regulations and
issue directives … “.
48 See for an overview over the most important developments from the European Parliament´s 1984
Draft EU Treaty, the proposal of the Italian delegation in the context of the IGC leading to the Treaty
of Maastricht and the reactions of the Commission and the European Parliament, to the Declaration No.
16 to the Maastricht Treaty: Hoffmann, Hierarchy of norms in European Community Law, in: Certain
Rectangular Problems of European Integration, Study prepared under the Direction of Weiler, Harvard
Law School and European University Institute, Florence, 1996.
49 See Articles 39 [ex-48] (3) (d) and 86 [ex-90] (3).
50 Craig/de Burca, EU Law, Oxford, 1998, p. 453.
51 Case 6/71, Rheinmühlen Düsseldorf v. Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel,
[1971] ECR 823 (841); Case 34/78, Yoshida Nederland BV v. Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken
voor Friesland [1979] ECR 115; Case 114/78,Yoshida GmbH v. Industrie- und Handelskammer
Kassel, [1979] ECR 151; Case C-478/93, Netherlands v Commission [1995] ECR I-3081; C-303/94,
European Parliament v Council of the European Union, [1996] ECR I-2943.© EIPA May 2000 46
4.3.2.2. Allocation of Law-making Powers in the Member States
The EC Treaty lacks, however, a clear definition of how to separate basic acts
(legislative acts) from implementing acts. The constitutional systems of the Member
States face the same problem of how to distinguish legislative acts and implementing
acts and have solved this issue in different ways.
The French system provides an apparently clear separation of legislative (Article 34)
and executive (Articles 37 and 21) functions, but on the other hand also provides in its
Article 38 that the executive is allowed to adopt acts of a legislative nature.
52 The
constitutional approach of the 1958 Constitution can be contrasted with the German
constitutional rules on the allocation of law-making powers between legislator and
executive.
53 The German constitution severeyl restricts the allocation of such powers.
The German Constitutional Court, in particular with its theory of essentialness
(Wesentlichkeitstheorie), has undertaken to define and police the allocation between
legislative and executive powers. The UK system, on the other hand, is characterised
by its total absence of legal criteria for the allocation of law-making powers. The
principle of parliamentary sovereignty means that no legal restrictions can be placed
on an Act of Parliament, which might contain as much or as little content as it pleases.
With regard to implementing acts, the UK system relies to a large extent on political
and judicial supervision of these acts and not on a definition of their scope.
54
4.3.2.3. Theoretical Considerations
The approach in the Member States to divide the line between legislative and
executive acts, is, to some extent, based on theoretical considerations.
4.3.2.3.1. The Role of Basic Acts and Implementing Acts in a Legal System
Kelsen’s hierarchy of norms
55 demonstrates the connection between basic acts and
implementing acts. Kelsen argued
56 that each legal norm could be based on a higher
norm until one reaches the Grundnorm from which all other acts emanate. Every
norm contains two forms of legal rules; one contains substantive (general) rules, the
other organisational rules authorising norms of a lower level to create law. The norm
below the Grundnorm in the hierarchy of norms derives its authority from the higher
norm, but can also contain substantive and organisational rules for norms of a lower
level. This produces a cascade of acts that lead to ever more specific rules, which
result in an individual act applicable to the individual. Basic act and implementing
                                                
52 See Boyer-Mérentier, Les Ordonnances d l’Article 38 de la Constitution du 4 Octobre 1958, Aix,
1996; Picard, Delegation of Legislative Power in French Public Law, in: Andeans, Türk, Delegated
Legislation and the Role of Committees in the EC, Kluwer Law International, 2000.
53 See Türk,  Delegated Legislation in German Constitutional Law, in: Andeans, Türk,  Delegated
Legislation and the Role of Committees in the EC, Kluwer Law International, 2000.
54 See Tomkins, Delegated Legislation in the English Constitution, in: Andeans, Türk,  Delegated
Legislation and the Role of Committees in the EC, Kluwer Law International, 2000.
55 Kelsen, Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, Ringhofer and Walter (eds.), Wien, 1979, and Kelsen,
Reine Rechtslehre, Leipzig and Wien, 1934.
56 Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, Leipzig and Wien, 1934, p. 62 et subs.© EIPA May 2000 47
acts have to be seen as a whole, as only both will form the totality of legal rules
applicable to the citizen.
57
Kelsen’s theory makes it possible to understand the link between basic act and
implementing act in the EC legal system. The Council can only adopt norms that
delegate powers to the Commission, if a higher-ranking norm allows it to do so.
Article 202 3
rd indent contains the norm that authorises the Council to delegate
implementing powers to the Commission. The act adopted by the Council corresponds
to the Kelsen’s model, as it contains substantive rules and organisational rules, the
latter authorising the Commission to act. The authorising norm (Article 202 3
rd
indent), the delegating norm (basic act) and the norm exercising powers contained in
the enabling norm (implementing act) form a whole that contains the relevant law.
None of these three elements can be eliminated without distorting the meaning of the
law.
58
4.3.2.3.2. Justification for the Allocation of Law-making Powers
However, Kelsen’s theory does not determine the level of detail of an act at each level
of the legal system. More traditional legal theories developed by Hobbes,
Montesquieu, Locke and Rousseau seek justifications for the allocation of powers
between the legislative and the executive. These theories have been developed in the
19
th century, mainly to justify the actual allocation of powers between the legislator
and the executive.
59
Modern constitutional systems tend to base their allocation of law-making powers on
the principle of democracy and the rule of law. These principles are once again related
to the nation state and might not necessarily be capable of being applied to the EC
legal system. It seems, however, that whereas the results of the application of such
principles in the national systems cannot be transferred without adaptation to the EC
level, these principles form part of the legal heritage on which the EC is founded and
could serve as valuable guidance and inspiration. Moreover, Article 6 (1) of the EU
Treaty emphasises the democratic principle and the rule of law as principles on which
the EU is based. Some writers reject, however, the idea of applying general principles
to solve concrete problems even in the national context.
60
A justification for the allocation of law-making powers could be seen in the
circumstance that each act has certain characteristics that make it best suited to pursue
a certain task. This approach is based on the specific functions exercised by the
institutions and the procedures and legal instruments they have at their disposal to
pursue these functions. Each legal act has to be measured against certain parameters,
such as the organic qualities of the institution (democratic nature, composition,
problem-solving capacity) that adopts it, its procedural structure (participation of
other institution, transparency, control etc) and constitutional requirements. The
respective qualities are then set in relation to the functions to be performed.
61 In this
                                                
57 See Guiheux, la notion de délégation en droit public, Thèse 1996, Rennes.
58 Guiheux, La notion de délégation en droit public, Thèse 1996, Rennes.
59 Rottmann, Der Vorbehalt des Gesetzes und die grundrechtlichen Gesetzesvorbehalte, EuGRZ
(Europäische Grundrechtszeitschrift) 1985, p. 277.
60 See Staupe, Parlamentsvorbehalt und Delegationsbefugnis, Berlin, 1986, pp. 182 et subs.
61 See Staupe, Parlamentsvorbehalt und Delegationsbefugnis, Berlin, 1986, pp. 201 et subs.© EIPA May 2000 48
respect it seems to be useful to consider the impact of acts on the individual (human
rights), its political importance (e.g. budget, acts that affect a large number of people)
and their effect on the institutional system (e.g. efficiency).
4.3.2.3.3. Control over the Implementing Act by the Basic Act
The enabling act (basic act) can use various techniques to govern the implementing
act. These methods are linked to the nature of legal acts. Two such techniques can be
distinguished.
62 The basic act may lay down conditional programmes, e.g. determine
that  “if it rains everybody has to use an umbrella”. This programme provides a
particular solution for a particular problem. The level of detail might vary. It could be
left for an implementing act to define the amount of rain necessary to trigger the
obligation to use an umbrella, or it could specify what an umbrella is, etc. The basic
act might also lay down purpose-oriented programmes, which describe a particular
problem, but allow for different options in an implementing act of how to solve the
problem. This norm could be formulated as follows: the norm sets out the dangers of
rain to human health. Here the aim is to protect humans from rain, but only to the
extent that is required to protect their health.
In addition to the control that can be exercised through the basic act by the legislative
authorities, the constitutional systems of the Member States and the EC rely on
judicial review exercised by the courts. In most systems ordinary or administrative
courts exercise such review. In all systems the judiciary leaves a greater or lesser
degree of discretion to the implementing act.
4.3.3.  The Role of the European Court of Justice
4.3.3.1. The Enforcement of the Hierarchy of Norms by the European Court of
Justice: Case C-159/96, Portugal v. Commission, [1998] ECR I-7379 as an Example
4.3.3.1.1  Introduction
It is evident that there is a need for an effective control of the compliance of the EC
institutions with this hierarchy of norms. As far as implementing acts are concerned,
the comitology committees with their tendency to create an “esprit de corps” or
“Fachbruderschaft” which is more likely to establish mechanisms of defence against
“outside” attacks than mechanisms of control versus the Commission can hardly be
seen as a provider of a guarantee that the limits of the basic legislation are observed.
63
This is a task assigned by the EC Treaty to the European Court of Justice: Both
individuals (in a Art. 230 [ex-173] procedure, if an implementing measure is of
“direct and individual concern” to them, or otherwise under Art. 234 [ex-177]
procedures) and Community institutions and Member States (in Art. 230 procedures)
                                                
62 See Busch, Das Verhältnis des Art. 80 Abs. 1 S. 2 GG zum Gesetzes- und Parlamentsvorbehalt, pp.
134 et subs., Berlin, 1992.
63 Falke, Komitologie - Entwicklung, Rechtsgrundlagen und erste empirische Annäherung, in: Das
Ausschußwesen der Europäischen Union, Joerges/Falke, Baden-Baden, 2000, p. 43, 72.© EIPA May 2000 49
can request a judgment of the Court whenever there is a possible violation of the
hierarchy of norms.
64
In the past the Court has repeatedly annulled both basic acts which had no or a wrong
legal basis in the Treaty,
65 and implementing acts which did not respect the basic
legislation under which they were adopted, or had no legal basis in that basic act.
66 A
recent example of the latter case is the judgment of the Court of 19 November 1998.
67
In that judgment the Court annulled the decision adopted by the Commission
“following the favourable opinion of the Textile Committee, which met on 6 March
1996, concerning the importation of textile products and clothing originating in the
People´s Republic of China”, because the Commission had exceeded its
implementation powers.
4.3.3.1.2.  Legal Background of the Case
In 1988 the Community and the People´s Republic of China signed the Agreement on
trade in textile products
68 which was provisionally applied in the Community by
Council Decision 88/656/EEC.
69
Council Regulation 3030/93/EC on common rules for imports of certain textile
products from third countries
70 (as amended by Council Regulation 3289/94/EC
71)
defines the system for importation into the Community of textile products originating
in third countries which are linked to the Community by agreements, protocols or
arrangements, or which are members of the World Trade Organisation.
                                                
64 See Bücker/Schlacke, “Politische Verwaltung” durch EG-Ausschüsse, in: Das Ausschußwesen der
Europäischen Union, Joerges/Falke, Baden-Baden, 2000, p. 161, 239-254. They stress, however, with a
reference to Bradley Kieran St. Clair, Institutional aspects of comitology: Scenes from the Cutting
Floor, in: Joerges/Vos (eds): EU Committees: Social Regulation, Law and Politics, Oxford, 1999, p.
71-93 that whereas it is possible to challenge the legality of binding legal acts, “it is, in principle, not
possible to challenge directly in legal proceedings any decision of a committee, whether this is
scientific, advisory or comitology in character”.
65 See e.g. C-84/94, United Kingdom v Council of the European Union, [1996] ECR I-5755. A case
pending at the moment is C-376/98, Germany against the European Parliament and the Council of the
European Union. Germany argues in this case that the “tobacco” Directive 98/43/EC on the
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to
the advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products ([1998] OJ L 213/9) was adopted without any legal
basis in the Treaty.
66 See e.g. C-303/94, European Parliament v Council of the European Union, [1996] ECR I-2943. In
this case the Court annulled a Council implementing measure which had “modified, without following
the legislative procedure prescribed by the Treaty … the scope of the obligations imposed on the
Member States by the basic directive”. The implementing directive had provided “only for protection
of water intended for the production of drinking water”, therefore failed to “take account of the effects
which plant protection products may have on all groundwater”and thus “affected the scope of the
principles defined in the basic directive”.
See also Case C-156/93, European Parliament v Commission of the European Communities, [1995]
ECR I-2019, where the European Parliament´s argument that the Commission had exceeded the limits
of its competences was rejected by the Court.
67 C-159/96, Portuguese Republic v Commission of the European Communities, [1998] ECR I-7379.
68 The Agreement was signed pursuant to Article 4 of the 1973 Multilateral Arrangement regarding
International Trade in Textiles (the “Multifibres Agreement”) to which the Community became a party
by Council Decision 74/214/EEC, [1974] OJ L 118/1.
69 [1988] OJ L 380/1.
70 [1993] OJ L 275/1.
71 [1994] OJ L 349/85.© EIPA May 2000 50
4.3.3.1.3.  The Facts of the Case
The Commission found during the early months of 1996 that the competent Chinese
authorities had issued export licences for certain textile products which exceeded the
quantitative limits agreed between the Community and China for 1995. As a result,
the products sent from China remained blocked on entry to the customs territory of
the Community. The Commission expressed its disapproval of those breaches of the
quantitative limits and requested the Chinese authorities to remedy the inadequate
administration of the limits and to intensify the computer network linking the Chinese
and Community systems for the transmission of data concerning the granting of
export and import authorisations.
The Chinese authorities admitted that it was true that the exceeding of the quotas was
due to a breakdown of the Chinese administration´s computer system. They
maintained, however, that other factors had contributed to complicating the
monitoring of the compliance with the quantitative limits, especially the falsification
of export licences. They requested the application of “flexibility measures” by
adjusting the quantities provided for under the 1996 quotas.
On 6 March 1996 the Commission called an urgent meeting of the Textile
Committee.
72 At that meeting the Commission proposed to charge the 1995 breaches
against the 1996 quotas. The Textile Committee delivered a favourable opinion to that
proposal.
73 After the meeting the Commission adopted a decision in which it
authorised the importation of textile products from China with respect to 1995 in a
quantity higher than that provided for in the EEC-China Agreement and in Regulation
3030/93, and reduced the corresponding amount of import quantities for 1996.
In May 1996 Portugal brought an action for annulment of the Commission decision
before the European Court of Justice. It claimed that the Commission did not have the
competence to adopt the contested decision and had thus violated the Council
Regulation.
4.3.3.1.4. The Judgment of the European Court of Justice
4.3.3.1.4.1. General Principles
Before determining whether the Commission had the “power to adopt the contested
decision on the basis of Articles 8 or 12 (4) and (8) of the Regulation”, the Court
deemed it “necessary to examine the Commission´s powers in relation to the
administration of import quotas for textile products” and thus recalled some general
principles concerning the adoption of implementing acts:
“Where Article 145 of the Treaty provides that “the Council shall... confer on
the Commission, in the acts which the Council adopts, powers for the
                                                
72 The Textile Committee is a IIIa) comitology committee (see Art. 17 of Council Regulation
3030/93/EC).
73 Belgium, Spain and Greece expressed reservations because of the “size and repetitive nature” of the
breaches. Portugal voted against the Commission´s proposal “by reason of its opposition in principle to
exceptional flexibility measures and of the damage suffered by the Community industry”.© EIPA May 2000 51
implementation of the rules which the Council lays down”, it follows from the
Treaty context in which Article 145 must be placed and also from practical
requirements that the concept of implementation must be given a wide
interpretation.
74 Since only the Commission is in a position to watch closely
and constantly international market trends and to act quickly when necessary,
the Council may confer on it wide powers in this sphere. Consequently, the
limits of those powers must be determined by reference amongst other things
to the essential general aims of the legislation in question. Thus, the
Commission is authorised to adopt all the measures which are necessary or
appropriate for the implementation of the basic legislation, provided that they
are not contrary to such legislation or to the implementing legislation adopted
by the Council
75”.
4.3.3.1.4.2.  Art. 12 of Regulation 3030/93
The Court then excluded Art. 12 of Regulation 3030/93
76 as a possible legal basis
because it only concerned the procedure for monitoring the compliance with the
quantitative limits. In the opinion of the Court this was “clear from the general
scheme of the system defined by the Regulation”. Art 12 (4) and (8) could therefore
not “confer upon the Commission the power to change those limits”:
-  The fact that the Commission had to establish a “contact” with the authorities of
the supplier countries pursuant to Article 12 (4) of the Regulation (when the
notified requests exceeded the available quotas) could “not justify an agreement
with the authorities of that country providing for a derogation from the
Community quantitative limits fixed by the Council”.
-  Also the measures referred to in Article 12 (8) served only to “implement the
procedure for administering available quotas”.
4.3.3.1.4.3.  Art. 8 of Regulation 3030/93
The Court then considered Art. 8 of the regulation
77 as a possible legal basis of the
Commission decision because it was “clear from the very wording of Article 8” that it
authorised the Commission to “allow opportunities for imports greater than the
quantities available under the total Community quantitative limits”.
The question to be examined was, however, whether “particular circumstances” as
required by Art. 8 existed that were “capable of justifying the authorisation of
additional quantities of imports” for 1995. In the eyes of the Court, Art. 8 could only
be  “interpreted restrictively”, since it allowed the Commission to offer additional
                                                
74 Case 23/75, Rey Soda v Cassa Conguaglio Zucchero, [1975] ECR 1279, paragraph 10.
75 See, in relation to agricultural matters, Case C-478/93 Netherlands v Commission [1995] ECR I-
3081, paragraphs 30 and 31.
76 Article 12 lays down the procedure relating to the issue of import authorisations. Art. 12 (4) provides
i.a. that “… the Commission shall contact the authorities of the supplier country concerned
immediately in cases where requests notified exceed the quantitative limits in order to seek clarification
and a rapid solution”. Under Art. 12 (8) “the Commission may … take any measure necessary to
implement this Article.”
77 Article 8 deals with the administration of the flexibility measures concerning the quantities of
imports. It provides i.a. that “… where, under particular circumstances, additional imports are
required, the Commission … may open up additional opportunities for imports during a given quota
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import opportunities “in derogation from the general system established by the
Regulation”:
-  The fact that the Chinese authorities had issued additional export licences mainly
because of a breakdown in their computer system could not justify the additional
import opportunities authorised by the Commission decision because the
exceeding of the quantitative limits had its origin in the administration of the
double-checking system established by the EEC-China Agreement. It could
therefore not described as an “unusual or unforeseeable event, but as a risk
inherent in the procedure for monitoring quantitative limits”.
-  The Commission had also not demonstrated that the situation in 1995 in which
there was an excessive number of export licences had occurred so suddenly that it
could not have adopted appropriate measures.
78
4.3.3.1.4.4.  Annullation of the Commission Decision
The Court concluded therefore that the Commission had exceeded its powers under
Regulation 3030/93: “In those circumstances … the contested decision must be
annulled”.
4.3.3.2. Allocation of Powers between Basic Acts and Implementing Acts by the
Court
The Court does not only enforce the hierarchy of norms, but also require that basic
acts contain a certain amount of detail, which cannot be dealt with in an implementing
act. The Court in Köster
79 has decided that basic acts must contain the basic elements
of a subject matter.
80 The Court has, however, been wary to interfere with the decision
of the legislator of what is dealt with by way of implementation and has to this day
not annulled a single act on the basis that it did not contain the basic elements. The
Court has left this issue to the “political” control of the comitology committees
instead of actively policing the allocation of powers in accordance with its criteria.
The Court has therefore de facto entrusted the ‘political’ institutions with the decision,
which matters should be contained in the basic act and which in the implementing act.
This approach appears not to be in conformity with most of the legal systems of the
Member States.
4.3.3.3. Definition of “Legislative” Act by the Court
The Court’s definition of implementing and basic act under Articles 202 [ex-145] 3
rd
indent and 211 [ex-155] 4
th indent stands in striking contrast to the Court’s definition
of legislative acts in cases concerning Article 230[ex-173] (4) and Article 288 [ex-
215] (2). Article 230 (4) allows individuals to challenge acts adopted by EC
institutions. In some cases the Court found that individuals could not challenge acts
                                                
78 Such as the measures provided for in Article 12 (1) of Regulation 3030/93.
79 Case 25/70 Einfuhrstelle v Köster [1970] ECR 1161. See also Case C-240/90 Germany v
Commission [1992] ECR I-5383.
80 See Bradley, Comitology and the Law: through a Glass, darkly, Common Market Law Review 1992,
p. 693; Haibach, Die Rolle von Ausschüssen in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und in der
Rechtsprechung des EuGH, Die Öffentliche Verwaltung 1997, p. 710; Türk, The Role of the Court, in:
Andeans, Türk,  Delegated Legislation and the Role of Committees in the EC, Kluwer Law
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that were legislative in nature. The decisive critirion in such cases was the general
applicability of the act
81 and not its form or the procedure used to adopt the act.
82
Under Article 288 (2) individuals can claim compensation, where an unlawful act
adopted by an EC institution caused them damage. Where individuals claim that a
“legislative” act has caused the damage, the Court has awarded compensation only
under restrictive conditions.
83 The Court has defined “legislative” in such cases in
accordance with the same criteria used to define “legisaltive” in cases brought under
Article 230 (4).
The definition of what constitutes a “legislative act” under Articles 230(4) and 288(2)
is therefore wider than the concept of “basic act” under Article 202 3
rd indent. As a
result, acts which are classified as implementing acts under Article 202 3
rd indent can
be legislative in nature under Articles 230(4) or 288(2). This approach seems to
question the basis of the objectives of this study, which seems to suggest that acts are
either legislative or implementing in nature. The (possible) existence of implementing
acts, which are legislative in nature, contradicts this assumption. The Court’s
approach is, however, in conformity with the allocation of law-making powers in the
national system, which provide for the possibility that acts with a legislative content
can be adopted by the executive. The term ‘legislative act’ can, therefore, be used in
relation to an act that is based on a competence provided for in the EC Treaty
(legislative act in the narrow sense), but also to an act, which is in substance of a
legislative nature (legislative act in the wider sense).
4.4. Conclusion: Checklist
The theoretical analysis in subproject 3a), as outlined above, should lead to a
development of criteria to differentiate legislative from implementing acts. These
criteria will then serve as a “checklist” for subproject 3b).
The empirical research undertaken in subproject 3b) will look at whether
implementing acts have remained within the scope of the basic acts, on the basis of
which they were adopted. The criteria developed in subproject 3a) will enable
subproject 3b) also to explore whether some implementing acts, even though they
formally remained within the powers granted to them in the basic act, actually
encroached on the competence of the legislative authorities, as they are dealing with
matters of a legislative rather than implementing nature.
                                                
81 See Case T-472/93 Campo Ebro v Council [1995] ECR II-421, where the Court held at para. 31 that
legal acts are of general applicability where they ‘apply to objectively determined situations and
produce legal effects vis-à-vis classes of persons envisaged in a general and abstract manner’.
82 See Case 147/83 Binderer v Commission [1985] ECR 257, where the Court held at para. 14 that ‘the
distinction between a regulation [i.e. a legislative act in substance] and a decision may be based only on
the nature of the measure itself and the legal effects which it produces and not on the procedures for its
adoption.’
83 See Case 5/71 Zuckerfabrik Schöppenstedt v Council [1971] ECR 975.© EIPA May 2000 54
Annex 1: Methodology of Subproject 3a)
1.  Methodological Basis
Subproject 3a) will analyse the wealth of literature and case law in the constitutional
systems of the Member States, in order to determine how these systems allocate
legislative and implementing powers between the law-making institutions. It is clear
that these findings cannot directly be applied to the EC legal system. However, certain
general principles and traditions can be extracted from the analysis.
In addition, theoretical considerations have to be developed. First, the role of
legislative and implementing acts in the context of the legal system as a whole will be
examined. Second, justifications have to be found for the adoption of legal acts by one
or the other branch of government and whether they are apt to be applied to the EC
legal system.
84 Third, criteria have to be developed as to which legal acts (legislative
or implementing acts) should be used for which functions of law-making. Fourth,
techniques have to be found with the help of which basic acts can control
implementing acts. Finally, the question of which institution should enforce the
allocation of law-making powers has to be raised.
General principles and traditions of the constitutional systems of the Member States
together with the more theoretical considerations outlined above, will be applied to
the EC legal system in order to find criteria to differentiate legislative from
implementing acts.
2.  Functional Approach Applied to EC Acts
Subproject 3a) proceeds on the hypothesis that a functional approach should be
applied to the EC legal system. Each legal act (characterised by the institution that
adopts it and the procedure in accordance of which it is adopted) is assumed to be best
suited to perform a certain function. To give an example, we might assume that the
co-decision procedure, is best suited for fundamental decisions concerning the
environment, whereas an act adopted by the Commission without control by
comitology committees or the EP is less apt for such a purpose. On the other hand,
where a speedy reaction is required that does not involve fundamental policy
considerations, as in case of adaptation of agricultural prices to changing market
conditions on the basis of strict criteria laid down in the basic act, a Commission
decision with or without control by committees, is better suited for this task than an
act adopted by the Council and the EP under the co-decision procedure.
The respective institutions (EP, Council and the Commission) will be assessed as to
their organic qualities (democratic nature, composition, problem-solving capacity),
the procedures they have at their disposal (participation of other institution,
transparency, control etc) and the efficiency with which they can act. Here, some
cross-fertilisation with subprojects I and II are expected.
                                                
84 The concept of government is taken here in its wide meaning and comprises all those bodies
exercising public power.© EIPA May 2000 55
Second, the acts founded on basic acts (implementing acts) will be considered in
accordance with the same principles as in the paragraph above. Emphasis will be
placed on the political (comitology committees) and judicial control (European Court)
that is currently exercised over these acts.
Third, it seems to be logic to apply the same principles that have been applied above
to the European Court. The Court’s review procedures have to be assessed as to their
strengths and weaknesses in the same way as it is done with regard to the other
institutions. This will determine whether the Court should exercise a full review of the
allocation of law-making powers or whether a more limited approach is to be
preferred. This will then also allow determining the adequate level of judicial control
of implementing acts. Part of the considerations has to be the level of “political”
control exercised over implementing powers and whether this political control is more
adequate then the review by the Court. The fact that many Member States rely in that
respect on a judicial control, which is mostly not exercised by a constitutional court,
but ordinary or administrative courts, should not be overlooked.© EIPA May 2000 56
Annex 2: Methodology of Subproject 3b)
We will examine a sample of implementing measures for which we propose to use a
(preliminary) typological scheme which views the adoption of implementing
measures either as executive rule making or fund approving.
85 The typological
scheme will be further refined on the basis of the results of the theoretical analysis in
subproject 3a). The criteria for differentiation are essentially material  in nature,
focusing on the substance of implementing decisions taken.
We differentiate three types of rule making implementation and two types of
budgetary measures as follows:
-  “Rule application”: refers to measures, which are adopted within the clear limit
values of the basic legal act (e.g. routine decisions in the market regimes of CAP,
but also for decisions like the embargo against British beef in the BSE case).
-  “Rule interpretation”: refers to cases in which minor adaptations of the original
legal act are made and the Commission has certain discretion/room for
manoeuvre (e.g. Commission decisions concerning mergers of companies).
-  “Rule-setting/evaluation”: refers to measures where, within a general framework
of a legal act, particularly directives, more specific rules are adopted (e.g. the
setting of limits in environmental law or adjusting safety requirements due to
technological change).
-  “Routine fund-approving”: refers to funding decisions within a specific, well-
defined framework laid down by the legislative authorities (e.g. the management
of specific R&D programmes and economic aid to third world countries).
-  “Extension/new specification of fund-approving”: refers to measures in which
either existing programmes are extended or modified (e.g. modification or
revision of an expenditure programme in R&D or foreign aid).
In addition to differentiating implementing measures according to the type of rule
making or fund approval, we also need to take the nature of decision on
implementation into account. Again we propose three categories for rule-making and
two categories for fund-approving measures as follows:
-  “Routine” (within clearly defined limits such as the setting of prices in market
regimes or approving specific research projects);
-  “Normative”  (setting/amending legal requirements like annexes of directives
resulting in a substantive change of the norms set out in the original legal act);
-  “Programmatic” (setting up new programmes in the field of R&D or initiating
new activities on the basis of an existing legal act);
-  “Budgetary I” (inside/internal clearly defined budgetary limits);
-  “Budgetary II” (the significant extension or modification of a budget line leading
to a significant change in expenditure).
                                                
85 The typological scheme is a further development of a differentiation proposed in: Schaefer,
Committees in the EC Policy Process: A First Step Towards Developing a Conceptual Framework, in,
Pedler/Schaefer, Shaping European Law and Policy: The Role of Committees and Comitology in the
Political Process, European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht, 1996.
The research team for this subproject has developed and tested this typological scheme in an earlier
study  (The Impact of the European Community Implementing Measures on EC Legislative and
Budgetary Authorities, 1999). In a random sample of 200 implementing measures, 20 critical cases
could be identified of which two represented a violation of the prerogatives of the legislators.© EIPA May 2000 57
By combining the two sets of categories we obtain the following matrix:
Routine Normative Programmatic Budgetary I Budgetary II
Rule
application
++
Rule
interpretation
+
Rule-setting/
evaluation
Routine fund
approving
(+) +
Extension
of/new
specification
of fund
approving
Critical instances where implementing measures may possibly have overextended the
competences of the executive and would have required the involvement of the
legislative authorities are cases that would fall into the shaded fields. By classifying a
sample of implementing measures it will be possible to identify these critical cases for
further analysis. During the classification procedure we are likely to encounter a
significant number of borderline cases, which will require revision and refinement of
the preliminary scheme. A reclassification of the whole sample will allow us to draw
general conclusions about the incidence, distribution and nature of community
implementing measures and whether and to what extent executive competences have
been overextended.© EIPA May 2000 58
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5. Subproject 4: The Committee System, Legitimacy, Citizen’s
perceptions and Acceptance of the EU-System of Governance
Torbjörn Larsson and Andreas Maurer© EIPA May 2000 62
5.1.1 Introduction
The purpose of this report is to present an overview of the discussion of political
legitimacy and its relevance for the different types of EU committees and their
functions. The report consists of two parts. The first one is a more general
introduction to ideas and thoughts about how legitimacy is created in a democratic
state (society). In the second one the ideas of legitimacy are linked to the discussion
of what is believed to be the functions of EU-committees.
5.1.2 The Traditional Way of understanding Political Legitimacy
One of the classical discussions in political science is the issue of political legitimacy
– that is, what gives the rulers the right (power) to impose their will on the people or,
slightly rephrased, why should the public follow the decisions taken by the rulers,
especially when a decision goes against their private interest?
The discussion has roots going far back in history, long before the democratic regimes
of today had emerged. Even the philosophers of ancient Greece found this topic to be
of great importance. Plato, for example, stressed the importance of rule by law in a
good government while the rule of men meant a bad government, and Aristotle
questioned whether it was ‘more convenient to be governed by the best men or by the
best laws’.
86 Thus, a concern for these early philosophers as well as for later ones was
the distinction between legitimate power and power which was not legitimate,
because if the power was exclusively founded on brute force what distinguished a
state from a band of robbers? Or, as the question once was formulated by St
Augustine:  ‘Without justice, what would in reality kingdoms be but bands of
robbers’?
87
Later, in the 19th century, Mosca saw two basic sources for authority given top down
from God, or bottom up from the people. To him, in other words, legitimacy was a
question of authority, not reason - the realisation of either God’s will or the will of the
people gave legitimacy to the decisions of the rulers.
88 The problem here, of course,
was to find a method that made it plausible to the public that the decisions that were
taken or the laws that were passed could be deduced from the will of God or the will
of the people. It is also worth mentioning that the will of the people in those days was
not necessarily manifested in general elections. Monarchs, for example, often saw
themselves as the supreme interpreters of the general opinion - ruling in the name of
the people but without consulting any representatives. And on the other hand, relying
on God almost always entails giving a lot of influence to the clergy – which is not
always a totally reliable source for the King’s intentions.
89
From the ‘pre-democratic’ days, at least two more types of arguments can be found
for how the political power of the rulers could be given legitimacy - one based on
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history and one based on natural law. In order to find principles and reasons justifying
the use of power by the rulers some would turn to the system that many believed to
exist ‘by natural order’ which had been in place since the beginning of mankind. Still
today some would argue that some natural rights (principles) are given to an
individual the moment he or she is born, principles which have to be respected by the
rulers and which can not be set aside. But what nature tells us is not always that easy
to translate into principles for ruling society. For example, one lesson that nature is
teaching us may well be interpreted as the survival of the fittest; a society founded on
Nietzscheism where the strong not only has the power but also the right to rule the
weak. However, in many cases, those who argued in favour of legitimacy based on
natural law did not make direct references to observations of the wilderness but to
observations made in the Bible. The Irish constitutions is, for example, to a large
extent based on natural law, and it lists several rights given to the people which
clearly originate from the Bible. In other words, although we frequently find
references to natural law legitimising the power of the rulers, it was not the order
among the flora and fauna that primarily engaged the thought of the philosophers of
the 18th and 19th centuries. Instead, the focus was on a theoretical construction of
what happened when the naked ape (man) for the first time had to adjust to some kind
of social order. This was supposed to have established some kind of social contract,
giving some individuals the right to rule others but only on certain conditions, i.e.
only if certain rights of those ruled were respected.
Anybody using historical arguments as means of justifying the public power will
follow one of two different roads - the conservative (static) or the more radical
(change). From the conservative point of view, and in the spirit of Burke, some laws
are more basic than other and get their special legitimacy simply from being very old,
just like some institutions and regulations.
90 When applying this perspective, the
rulers in those days had to build their legitimacy on the previous order and any change
to society had to be carried out gradually. In stark contrast to Burke and the
conservative ideas those with a more radical approach also used historical arguments
in their legitimacy strategy, but here the historical future was the focal point.
According to the radicals, what gave legitimacy to a revolutionary change of the state
was a deterministic historical process, going through a development of predetermined
changes affecting society. Thus the state had to change drastically in order to cope
with the changes in society if it were to survive at all.
Max Weber had to some extent a distinct approach to the question of legitimacy. To
him the question was not so much from what general principle the rulers could deduce
their right to rule the people but rather what made people follow certain leaders. He
identified three types - charismatic, traditional and rational leaders. We often find that
people will follow leaders just by tradition, they have been more or less indoctrinated
since birth to follow those who hold higher offices. In this case, the legitimacy is
largely linked to the office, not the person.
91 The charismatic leader on the other hand
gets his or her legitimacy from his or her personality. What Weber had noticed was
that certain leaders got what they wanted just because their personality inspired
confidence. The third type of legitimacy is based on rationality, i.e. people follow
leaders who make suggestions and decisions that are rational (logical), because they
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think this will solve the problem and it is presented in such a way that they can
understand it. Weber believed this to be the modern form of leadership, suitable for a
democracy. People would according to him in the future increasingly follow leaders
who could give rational and logical arguments to support their decisions. This type of
leadership would also mean the rule of law since rationality is the foundation for new
laws.
92
Thus, from the ancient Greeks and onwards, the discussion has been carried out
according to two principle lines. To begin: with from what sources can rulers deduce
their power if it is not to be based on brute force? Secondly, to what extent is the
power of the rulers limited and in what respect? The contemporary discussion
concerning democracy has ended up with a number of answers to these questions and
the arguments concerning the legitimacy of modern democracy are thus dependent on
what type of democracy is favoured.
5.1.3 Common Organisational Features of Democratic Regimes
The work of a government is basically twofold: the authoritative allocation of
resources and legitimacy building (support).
93 Or, to rephrase it, a government tries to
regulate basic conflicts in society by solving different types of what are regarded as
the current societal problems, e.g. unemployment and healthcare. Legitimacy-building
and problem-solving are interrelated and there is input and output in both cases.
Government input is when the government in its decision-making capacity respects
certain procedures, which are well known in advance and accepted by the public,
allowing the public to participate in and influence the decisions. Government output is
when it receives support from the public because it has proved its efficiency in its
problem-solving capacity.
94 The legitimacy of a political system is made clear by the
fact that the public is willing to participate in the decision-making procedure and by
the fact that the people respect and adhere to the decisions, even when they go against
their personal interests.
95
However, problem-solving is not just a rational technical means to find the best
solution to a specific problem; it is also about who gets what, when and how.
96 In
other words, problem-solving (the regulation of conflicts) is all about whose
preferences should be allowed to take precedence. In a democracy the simple answer
to this question is usually the majority.
97 But democracy is not only about the right for
the majority to rule (which some people see as the tyranny of the majority): minorities
also have rights in a genuine democracy.
98 In short, a democratic system concerns
problem-solving, efficiency and legitimacy but also the balance between majority rule
and minority (human) rights.
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Furthermore we will always find those who argue that democracy is not only
instrumental but a goal as such - a way for human beings to develop.
99
Democratic regimes can be organised in many different ways but there are generally
some common features. These common features, to a large extent, originate from the
traditional distinction of three different powers: legislative (decision-making),
executive and judicial, which in turn correspond to three different types of
institutions: an elected assembly (parliament), an executive (government) and a
judiciary (courts).
100 The assembly, elected by the public in free and open elections,
often comprises two chambers. All, or some, of the members of the upper (first)
chamber are often indirectly elected, or in rarer cases not elected at all but appointed.
Alternatively seats are inherited. In an assembly with two chambers, where only one
chamber is directly elected, the directly elected second chamber is the more powerful
one. The main object for the assembly is legislative but it also has functions like
supervising and scrutinising the executive and the judiciary. The parliament usually
get its legitimacy, its mandate to exercise power, from the fact that it is elected by the
people and in that sense is believed to represent the people.
The executive can either be of a monolithic or a dualistic type. In many cases the
government includes both a president and a prime minister, or a monarch and a prime
minister (who is figuratively the first minister of the monarch). But there are other
arrangements: Switzerland does not have a prime minister or a monarch but a rotating
presidency.
The normal function of the executive is to implement the decisions taken by the
assembly and to put forward suggestions to the assembly on how to change the
present legislation in different areas and how resources should be allocated in the
yearly budget. The executive often also has an important role to play in suggesting or
appointing people to higher offices such as the head or members of the board of the
Central Bank or judges in the Supreme or High Courts. How the executive gets its
legitimacy differs from one political system to another; in some cases the executive
gets its mandate by being appointed by and accountable to the assembly while in other
cases it gets it by being directly elected by the people.
The judiciary is of course mainly responsible for the application of laws, but it is also
involved in the functions of the executive and the assembly either through a
constitutional court or through judicial review exercised by the regular courts. The
right of the individuals to appeal government decision can also affect the execution of
government policies. As opposed to the assembly and the executive, the courts do not
build their legitimacy primarily on being elected (although judges are directly elected
in some countries) or by being appointed by an elected body. The real legitimacy of
the courts can be found in the fact that they are supposed to be independent from all
types of interests and outside pressure.
101 The impartial interpretation and application
of the law is the key to their authority, which sometimes is also true for other
governmental institutions like the central bank and the auditing office.
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Finally, it is important to remember that these entities do not function independently
from each other, they are part of a common political system. The role of and balance
between the three may differ from one democratic political system to another but if
changes are made in the functions of one, it affects the other two. Therefore, should
the rules and regulations that guide the work of an assembly be changed, for example,
it will most certainly also have an impact on how the executive and/or the judiciary
operate/s. However, to predict what is going to happen in other parts of the political
system is often difficult. In fact, what is sometimes seen as minor changes to one part
of the political system can have rather drastic effects as the consequences are felt
throughout the whole system.
102
Thus, although the balance between the three entities may vary greatly from one
country to another we seem to have three basic principles for organising a democratic
regime.
5.1.4 Contemporary Democratic Governments
One can discern two different types of democratic government, based on two different
principles that attribute varying degrees of relative importance to the four values of
efficiency (problem-solving capacity), legitimacy building, majority rule and minority
protection.
Fundamental to a democratic regime is, of course, the right for the majority to rule,
but this right does not go so far as to threaten the life and existence of minorities.
Therefore, in a democratic society, there has to be some kind of protection for the
individual (the smallest minority). The problem here is, of course, how to design this
protection while not making it so far reaching as to circumscribe the basic principle of
majority rule. What is needed, in other words, is some kind of balance between the
two principles. And here you will find a demarcation line between governments based
on power sharing (presidential or pluralist governments) and governments based on
the parliamentary idea.
103
Political systems based on the parliamentary principle are usually designed to promote
majority rule. In a parliamentary system this is done by giving more or less supreme
power to the parliament. The idea behind a parliamentary government is that it is a
system of successive delegation. To begin with the people delegate power to the
parliament in the election process, and the parliament in turn delegates power to the
executive to implement the will and wishes of the people. That way it can be said that
the people in a parliamentary system rule themselves, i.e. what is expressed is the will
of the majority of the people.
But even if the principle of majority rule is more clearly expressed in a parliamentary
system one usually finds mechanisms for protecting minorities. For example,
decisions such as amendments to the constitution may need a qualified majority in the
parliament to be accepted. In other cases there may be certain delaying techniques that
can be activated or are compulsory when a parliament is about to take a decision that
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might restrict a basic right for minorities. It is worth noting here that the demand for
qualified majority by voting means that we are talking about a ruling minority not a
majority - i.e. a minority can block (veto) a proposal from the majority side, although
it cannot impose a new decision. The power of veto is a choice between saying yes or
no, or maintaining the status quo or not, in other words.
5.1.4.1 Power Sharing Systems
A power-sharing system provides better protection for minorities as it is more
explicitly based on the idea of checks and balances. In a power-sharing system none
of the central parts of the government (executive, legislative and judiciary) has
supreme power over the others. In certain fields one may dominate but there are
always areas where the power is shared and public power is diffused rather than
centralised. There are two kinds of power-sharing techniques, and again one
emphasises the input and the other the output of government activity. The input has to
do with procedures that restrict the government and which have to be observed when
decisions are taken, while the output has to do with the content of certain decisions
(legal or not). To be more precise, on the input side it is quite common to find rules
prescribing that new laws must be adopted by a common accord between the
executive and the parliament - i. e. both must come to the same conclusion on the
phrasing of a new law. An example of how the output technique works is when courts
by their mandate of judicial review nullify laws they find to be in conflict with the
wording of the constitution.
Today it is in fact quite common when talking about a power-sharing system to refer
to the courts as guardians of the constitution against legislation which potentially
conflicts with it, be it parliamentary or decisions by the executive. But power-sharing
systems can be classified in different ways. It is, for example, possible to distinguish
between vertical and horizontal power sharing. Power sharing can be based on the
public institutions getting their legitimacy from the same sources, for example a
parliament and an executive both directly elected by the people. Here, we have a
situation where one majority is controlling another. In other words, should these
majorities be of the same type, there is no obvious protection of minorities.
The vertical principle of power sharing - a federal system - is characterised by a
division of power on different levels, where some limited power is given to a federal
level while the rest remains at the state level or is shared between the federal and state
level. It is, of course, debatable whether the states should be regarded as being below,
above or on a equal footing with the federal level, especially where the states are the
foundation for the federal level i.e. where it all began. In reality a power-sharing
system is often a mixture of different kinds of power-sharing principles - vertical and
horizontal - as well as input and output principles.
104
5.1.4.2 Different Types of Political Legitimacy
The different systems - power sharing and parliamentary - build their legitimacy in
two different ways. A parliamentary system gets its legitimacy from the fact that all
power is entrusted to a parliament that is elected by the people and that is superior to
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the other central governmental entities. Since the parliament is operating in the name
of the people it has more or less unlimited power; it can for example dismiss the
executive.
A high turnout on election day is therefore more critical in a parliamentary system
than in a power-sharing one, since this creates the impression that the parliament
speaks in the name of the people. In this way a parliamentary system is a simpler
construction and therefore easier to understand for, or explain to, the general public.
In contrast, a power-sharing system is more complicated and gets its legitimacy from
the fact that the power of the executive is controlled (limited) by checks and balances.
In short, the power is both disseminated between parts of the system and overlaps
them.
Consequently, a power-sharing system is often stronger when it comes to legitimacy
building than in problem-solving, since it usually provides better protection for
minorities and more than a simple majority is usually needed in order to change laws.
But again if, for example, the judiciary is weak and the same majority rule in the
different elected bodies, minorities may be even more neglected than in a
parliamentary system. In order to avoid this, elections to the different public
institutions are usually held at different times and/or one of the elected bodies does
not elect all its members at the same time. However, in most cases a power-sharing
system is pre-coded for making minimal decisions (which are in effect the lowest
common denominator) or maintaining the status quo. However, there are those who
claim that a parliamentary system acquires its legitimacy by its problem-solving
capacity and its efficient decision-making.
105
In reality no government fits the model of either a power-sharing or parliamentary
system perfectly and usually one finds some elements of both. In Ireland for example,
there is a predominately parliamentary system with a very pro-active judiciary.
5.1.4.3 Divided Government
However, in some countries the mixture of the two original models is so intricate that
it is more appropriate to talk about a third type of model, which could be called
divided government.
106 In France, for example, a horizontal power-sharing system is
combined with a parliamentary system. In France and Finland the president, as well as
the parliament, is elected directly by the people and the president appoints the
executive, but the prime minister and individual ministers can be removed by a
motion of censure by the parliament. In Germany there is a parliamentary system not
only combined with an activist court system but also with a vertical power-sharing
(federal) system, while the Spanish system gives a lot of power to its autonomous
regions.
Summing up, three types of democratic government can be discerned. A
parliamentary one, a power-sharing one and a combination of the two called a divided
government. However, theoretically speaking there is of course a fourth model - so far
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not mentioned - direct democracy. Seen by ancient Greek philosophers and 19th
century democracy theorists as the only genuine type of democracy, in contrast to
representative democracy, which to them meant a ruling elite. Maybe the best known
form of direct democracy is the referendum. Some people still see direct democracy
as the only true form of democracy but no government today uses it as their basic
principle of organisation.
107 Even Switzerland, often used as an example in the
discussion of the pros and cons of direct democracy, is predominantly ruled by the
principle of indirect democracy - a power-sharing system of the vertical type.
108 All
the same, in most democratic governments one finds some element of direct
democracy, but not in the EU.
Within democratic governments one also discovers on examination that parliamentary
systems are not always what they pretend to be, so let us take a closer look at the
relationship between the parliament and the executive.
5.1.5 The Parliament and the Executive
An exact definition of a parliamentary system is far from easy to give and those who
have tried often end up listing a number of criteria, not all of which will be mentioned
here.
109 However, an essential element of parliamentary theory is the link between the
parliament and the executive. In a parliamentary system the executive is accountable
to the parliament and the executive is, for its very existence, dependent on the
majority of the parliament. The parliament both scrutinises and criticises the work of
the executive. However, the institutional link between the executive and the
parliament can be so tight that it is sometimes hard to draw a sharp line between the
two. In Britain, for example, every member of the government is at the same time a
full member of the parliament. However, in most other parliamentary governments
ministers need not be selected from the parliament but can also be recruited from
outside. In some countries members of parliament who become ministers lose their
right to vote in parliament.
An important instrument with which the parliament is supposed to control the
executive is through the right to raise a motion of censure against the whole
government or against individual ministers, but this is of course a sword which cuts
both ways. When a government is not getting acceptance for their major policies by
the parliament it could, and should, according to parliamentary theory, threaten to
resign, i.e. it should be subjected to a vote of confidence. Parliament will then either
have to face the consequences of the government resigning or else accept the
government’s proposal. In other words, the option to control the government by
bringing it down is not always the powerful instrument it appears. However, the
government also has other means to counter the power of the parliament. In most
countries the government has the right to dissolve the parliament, which of course is
an important counter balance to the parliament’s right to issue a motion of censure
against the government. In some countries a government can even counter a motion of
censure by dissolving the parliament.
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Furthermore, it may be true that the parliament takes the final decision on new laws
and scrutinises the implementation of old ones, but normally the executive initiates
and puts forward suggestions on how the future policy should be formulated. In some
parliamentary systems the parliament can only reject or amend the proposals made by
government. It is also the case in some systems that the government’s proposal for a
new budget is accepted automatically if the parliament does not reject it before a
certain date. In yet other countries, the executive can partly side step the parliament’s
law-making function by using the right to rule by decree.
110
5.1.5.1 Interdependency
Thus, even in parliamentary systems the parliament can find it difficult to control the
executive and in reality it is often better to describe the relationship between the
parliament and the executive in terms of interdependency instead of hierarchy and
dominance. Furthermore, if one of the two dominates the other, it is more likely to be
the executive, not the parliament. A closer look at the parliamentary systems of
Europe will show, for example, that almost always there are arrangements working in
favour of the executive - either in terms of how a government is formed and dismissed
or how laws are passed through the parliament. In Germany, for example, the
parliament cannot move to censure the government if it does not have an alternative
candidate for the post of Chancellor. In Sweden, no one actually has to vote in favour
of the candidate for prime minister, only those who vote against him should not
constitute a majority.
111 Meanwhile, in Italy and France there is the possibility of
ruling by decree, and in the United Kingdom a large number of the members of
parliament on the ruling side are at the same time members of the government.
Even in genuine parliamentary systems there are, in other words, a lot of checks and
balances between the central entities of the government and particularly between the
parliament and the executive.
The paradox is that it is in the power-sharing systems where the parliament has the
most influence in terms of policy making, while in parliamentary system it boils down
to the right to appoint and censure the executive. Large changes in proposals
presented by the government to the parliament are not supposed to happen.
112 In
principle, the parliamentary majority is supposed to support the government’s
proposals. The role of the opposition is to oppose them more or less totally. In the end
this usually means that the parliament is performing a kind of controlling function
over the decision-making process, making sure that the proper methods of decision-
making have been observed and that all relevant differences of opinions have been
heard. In a parliamentary democracy, the major part of the policy-making process
often takes place before a proposal reaches the parliament and that is where the big
changes and compromises are made. In fact a lot of the influence MP’s have is
exercised outside parliament.
In a power-sharing system the relationship between the parliament and the executive
is, in theory, different from the relationship in a parliamentary system. In a power-
sharing system the different powers of the state are first separated and then made to
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balance each other. Thus, in a true power-sharing system, a government is not
dependent on the majority of the parliament for its existence, and the parliament
cannot bring down the government as a result of a motion of censure or a vote of no
confidence. The only way for the parliament to dismiss the head of the government is
through impeachment. On the other hand, the executive cannot dissolve the
parliament, but in some states the head of state can impose marshal law without the
consent of the parliament. However, the parliament can refuse, after careful
examination, to accept the ministers suggested by the prime minister or president for
his/her government or the higher civil servants the government wants to appoint.
This means that parliamentary and power-sharing governments are more alike than is
generally believed: power-sharing systems to a large extent get their legitimacy from
directly elected bodies and parliamentary governments include a lot of mechanisms to
provide checks and balances between the executive and the parliament.
But parliaments are also supposed to fill the important function of linking the people
to the government, i.e. to represent the people. One of the most important element s in
a democratic system today is a body representing the people which has been elected in
free and open elections. However, what is to be included in the concept of
representation usually leaves room for discussion. We find a clear division between
representing different opinions in society and representing social groups or strata. In
other words, the public opinion is thought to be expressed in the parliament and any
person (man) should be able to be elected to the parliament - in that way members of
the parliament become a mirror of society. In reality, the idea of a representative
government can not be fully met and certain legitimacy gaps will always appear. For
example, in order to maximise the opinions expressed in the parliament the MPs
would need to be free from any affiliation to the political parties. On the other hand if
every MP was a free agent - i.e. constituted a political party of his own - it would be
difficult for low income person with few assets to be elected.
113 In other words,
political parties make it easier for ordinary people to be elected to parliament but this
improved representation has it price - fewer opinions are expressed in the parliament
since parties not people are behind the opinions expressed.
5.1.6 Political Parties and Modern Democracy
So far we have only discussed the formal (constitutional) part of the government of
today’s democracies. However, in order to fully understand modern democracies one
also has to take into account the more informal structures and organisations of a
political system. Three types of actors are of particular interest here: political parties,
interest groups and the media. This paper, however, focuses on political parties since
they play a special role in the relationship between parliaments and executives.
What has previously been described as characterising the different types of
constitutional governments take on a different aspect when one considers the informal
parts of the political system. In the case of divided governments the party political
structure is of particular interest, as the result of an election may drastically change
the character of the constitutional design of the government from one day to another.
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A well-known example is that in parliamentary systems where there is an
institutionalised division between the executive and the parliament, with the
parliament supposedly controlling the executive, the gap between them being bridged
by well-disciplined political parties. The main feature of modern democracies in the
20th century is not the leading role of the parliaments but of the political parties.
114 By
means of general elections it is decided which party or parties will be in government
and which in opposition. Thus it is closer to the truth to say that in parliamentary
systems today, the parliament is often an arena for competition between the political
parties rather than an actor in its own right. In fact, when suggestions are made to
empower or to extend the influence of the parliament, the suggestions are in reality
normally either in favour of increasing the power of the opposition or the
parliamentary delegation/s of the ruling side. Today, the parliaments do not control
the governments, this is done by the political opposition with the assistance of interest
groups, the public and, increasingly, by the media.
115
5.1.6.1 The Party Structure
The party structure may vary from basically a two-party structure to a multi-party one
and from a culture of strongly disciplined political parties to one with more
fragmented parties. Furthermore, the party structure can, from an ideological point of
view, be either predominately one-dimensional or multi-dimensional. In a country
where the party system tends to be one-dimensional we often find left-wing parties in
coalition against right-wing parties or vice versa. On the other hand, should the party
structure be of a multi-dimensional type it is more difficult to predict which parties
are going to join forces and form a government.
Party governments can therefore belong to different categories. A distinction is
usually made between minority and majority governments and between one-party
governments and coalition governments. A one-party government with a majority in
the parliament is often described as a strong government and a coalition government
lacking a majority of its own is seen as a weak government.
116 The development of
the party system thus affects the balance between minority and majority rule, as well
as the problem-solving capacity and legitimacy of the state.
To begin with, in a predominately two-party system the government will of course be
of the majority type. This will further reinforce the already strong tendency in a
parliamentary system for majority rule and problem-solving efficiency. On the other
hand, we find that the structure of a party government can be a counter force to the
basic constitutional character of the system. This means that in a parliamentary system
more protection is given to minorities, while in a power-sharing system majority rule
is reinforced. In some countries, parliamentary governments are not formed from
coalitions based on the principle of the minimum number of parties necessary to rule;
instead they opt for large coalitions. In countries like Finland and the Netherlands the
formation of a government is more about which party or parties should be excluded
from government rather than which parties should be included.
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Multi-party systems in general provide better protection of minorities especially if
small parties have been given seats in the government. Large coalition governments,
called consensual democracy by Lijphart, not only provide better protection of
minorities in parliamentary systems but also maintain some capacity for majority rule
and effective problem-solving. There is, of course, a limit as to how small a minority
can be in order to be protected by the political party system and very small groups
never make it to the parliament. The rights of an individual against the state can after
all only be protected by recourse to the legal system.
117
Should, on the other hand, the same party or parties constitute a majority in several
elected bodies of a power-sharing system the checks and balances between the
different government bodies can become less effective. But since elections to the
different bodies are seldom held on the same date in power-sharing systems, the result
is quite often different majorities in different bodies. However, in a power-sharing
system the basic character of the system is not only defined by the relationship
between the elected bodies, but several other types of checks and balances operate
which limit the development of a really strong government.
In a divided government system the picture is more muddled. The result of an election
can quickly affect the character of the system and shift it in another direction, away
from the parliamentary type of system to a power-sharing one. The so-called
‘cohabitation’ which occurs from time to time in France is a good example of this
phenomenon.
The role of the parliament differs according to the structure of the party system. In a
power-sharing system the parliament is more likely to be a policy-making arena,
while in a parliamentary system it is more likely to be one of competition between the
party or parties in power and the opposition. But we also find differences in different
parliamentary regimes. In some countries with a predominantly two-party system, like
in the United Kingdom, we have a ‘talking’ parliament. The opposition has little or no
chance at all to directly influence the proposals for new laws that are put forward by
the government. What is left for the opposition is to publicly point out what they
believe to be the major drawbacks with the government’s proposals and hope that
public opinion will force the government to change its mind. In countries where the
government is often of a minority type the situation is somewhat different. Here the
opposition at least gets a chance to directly influence new policy presented by the
government. However, influencing public opinion may not be the best way to
maximise this influence. As a result we get a parliament in these countries that is less
skilled in brilliant rhetoric and more focused on negotiating behind closed doors with
the government - a ‘working’ parliament as opposed to a talking one.
The different political systems are also more or less suitable for different types of
societies. A society characterised by strong conflicts about language, religion, ethnic
and regional identity and possibly even ideology would probably be better off with
some kind of power-sharing system but a parliamentary government is better suited to
fill the needs of a more homogeneous society.
118 It should therefore come as no
surprise that the government of Belgium, trying to control a society characterised by
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strong tension between three groups separated by language, region and religion, has
moved in its organisational design from a consensual, parliamentary type of
government towards a power-sharing system of a federal type. The opposite seems to
be happening in Finland, as the tension between ethnic groups and classes is
decreasing. The Finnish government has developed towards a more genuine
parliamentary system - less power to the president and QMV is usually no longer
needed in the parliament to pass laws.
To summarise, the pre-coded tendency in the constitutional structures of different
types of government to favour the principle of majority rule or the protection of
minorities can, in terms of legitimacy building or problem-solving capacity, be
reinforced or balanced out by the structure of the informal government. How strong
this effect will be to some extent depends on how well-disciplined the political parties
are. In some countries, like the United States, party discipline is weak, and if the same
party should happen to gain the majority in all the elected bodies the impact will not
be as strong as when the same thing happens in France.
However, parties and other informal actors (interest organisations and media) are
important also for other reasons as they are channels linking people to the government
and not only on election day. An important question for a democratic society is
therefore to what extent it should encourage the people to interact with the
government. Here we find to basic principles juxtaposed against each other
governments encouraging as much interactions as possible and governments referring
more limited interaction and, stressing voting as the supreme form of interaction.
119
In the next part of this report the discussion of political legitimacy will be applied to
the EU system and its committees.
                                                
119 For example Schumpeter, J.A. (1976), Held, D. (1997), chapter 7.© EIPA May 2000 75
5.2. Theoretical Perspectives on Committees, Administrative Interaction and
Legitimacy of governance in the European Union
5.2.1.Introduction: Committees in the European Union – Substantial Features of
and in a Growing Multi-Level System
The European Union (EU) is a political system in full evolution. It is undergoing
fundamental changes in respect to its functional as well as to its geographical scope
and organisational structure. Permanent institutional and procedural changes, the
outcomes of the Treaty on European Union and the newly introduced Amsterdam
Treaty have provided the Union with additional rights and obligations. Many key
issues −  embodying vital political sensibility −  have become subject matter to the
European Union over the past 45 years. Though many citizens take the increasing
competencies and the significance of the Union for granted, serious concerns circulate
about the transparency, legitimacy and democratic accountability of the EU,
particularly with regard to those acting within the European bureaucracy. In general
terms, committees play a significant role in national West-European political systems
as they are an elementary part of the functioning of modern governments and
governance. Related to the European Union, committees in the Council and the
European Commission deserve special attention and arouse controversial debates.
Major features determining this discourse are latent fears of an “Archipel Brussels”,
an ever-growing swamp bringing forth a new political class of „Eurocrats”.
120 Beyond
this popular scenario, analysing the impact of civil servants on the governing process
has a long and extremely varied academic tradition in Western Europe, evoking
stimulating research results in the fields of law, economic and social sciences.
121
However, most of these contributions focus on the national level. Though there has
been a significant rise in studies about European policy-making, governance by
committees and the related administration in the European sphere has so far found
only limited recognition.
Yet, one particular element of the Union's committee-administrative infrastructure has
found special attention in the last few years. Committees, which act on the basis of the
comitology decision 87/373 of the Council, have become a matter of serious
discussion.
122 The main controversy in the so-called »comitology debate« centers
around the question to what extent these comitology committees effect the process of
implementing Community legislation, how and through whom are they supervised
and controlled and how they exercise influence through some kind of a »government
by committee«.
123
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Besides this debate, committees and the related network of public administration in
the European sphere in more general terms is still met with scepticism and
indifference in academic discourses. For three reasons, much of the responsibility for
this state of affairs lies in the theoretical and methodical framework. First, academics
frequently tend to concentrate on the activities of a particular institution, a distinct
policy-sector or a particular type of decision making. Of course, differentiation across
the spectrum of EU policy-making and a detailed analysis is a prerequisite for
understanding the Community system. Nevertheless, a wider and more dynamic view
has to be considered as a necessary addition to such micro- or case-studies. A
perspective, which takes the variety of interactions between different actors into
account and embeds findings in a broader context so that observations can be
compared with other outcomes and overall developments, offers a substantial
completion. Second, research on European integration has difficulty in devising
empirical tests capable of demonstrating relevance and impact of integration theories.
Due to the lack of reliable data, clear empirical evidence is hard to achieve.
124
Especially the development of administrative committees is - according to their
vague, discretionary, amorphous and constantly evolving character – rather difficult to
measure. However, in order to develop a progressive research program, theories must
devise hypotheses and test them against real data. Third, theory on European
integration is primarily affiliated and marked by the nation-state. Methodological
challenges stem from the widespread use of nation-state-like categories and the need
to develop an analytical approach peculiar to administration in the European Union as
a whole.
With its current structure, the EU is neither comparable with national constitutional
systems nor with international organisations or associations. Its autonomous
development results from a process of growth and differentiation which has not reached
a final stage and might not do so in the near future. Thus, research on European
integration has to develop a more complex approach. We need coherent explanations
for the mechanisms through which committees shape political outcomes. Using state-
like instruments in its first pillar, the European Union has passed the boundary from
horizontal cross-border co-operation to vertical policy-making in a dynamic multi-
level system.
125 Such a new type of political system representing a new kind of polity
requires theoretical approaches which reveal the mutual interplay of both levels.
126
In order to accomplish these theoretical and methodological challenges, our
conceptual approach is based on a more general point of departure.
127 We do not
intend to scrutinise single actors or the specific function of committees in the various
stages of the policy process. Instead, we try to take a closer look at the general
dynamics of the EU’s political system and organisational structure in total. Assuming
that interaction through and within committees should not be researched in the
European sphere alone but also at the national level, we should take both perspectives
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into consideration. The phenomenon of committees as vital players in the European
decision-making process should be regarded as a kind of simultaneous interaction of
different institutional levels and several realms of European governance. It is essential
to reflect on both supranational institutions and different governance circuits and to
some extent on sub-units of national governments, as regional powers. We have to go
beyond those descriptions and categorisations which separate legislative activity of
the supranational institutions on the one hand, and policy-implementation activity of
national administrations on the other. Opening up the »black box« of European
legislation means in our study to analyse the patterns of interaction between
administrations and other actors in view of what allies and competitors are doing in
the political sphere. »Brussels« is thereby not an isolated arena but an integral part of
the relationship between interlocking systems, non-governmental networks,
governmental institutions and actors.
128
5.2.2. Committees in the Context of Public Administration and Policy
Formulation
The increasing role of committees in European governance can be seen as a response
to the need for an ever higher level of technical "expertise", which stems from the
growing complexity of regulating contemporary western societies. The role itself is to
define and to solve substantive policy problems. In multi-level governance systems
like federal political systems, committees also perform another function: they ensure
efficient co-ordination mechanisms between the different levels of government.
129
The growing regulatory tasks of the EC and the need for multi-level co-ordination
explain why the committee system is so highly developed in the EC system of
governance. A very basic typology identifies five different types of "committee" of
various sorts involved at every stage of the EC process:
-  The "expert" committees which provide the Commission with external advice
during the elaboration of EC proposals;
-  The role of institutions with consultative status such as the Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions;
-  The "working groups" and the Committee of Permanent Representatives
(COREPER) which prepare the decisions of the Council of Ministers;
-  The standing committees of the European Parliament through which the latter
exercises its legislative powers;
-  The "comitology committees" which assist the Commission in exercising its
implementing functions delegated to it by the Council and the Parliament.
Committees  „shape policy and play a significant role in contributing to the
formulation and adoption of binding rules”.
130 They can generally be defined as
“institutionalised groups of specialised and representative people”.
131 Committees
may fulfil rule-interpreting, fund-approving or rule-setting functions.
132 In other
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words, committees act both as decision-takers and decision-makers. Besides
comitology committees, one may find in the EU context consultative committees,
which are almost private, i.e. non-governmental as well as sectoral specialists and
expert groups consisting mostly of national administrators or specialists nominated by
the Member States surrounding the Commission. Administrators from the EU
institutions, the Member States and third parties are joined in several Council
infrastructure committees, COREPER, working groups and intergovernmental joint
committees. The potential influence of committees differs largely: Advisory
committees of the Commission have a high potential of influence at the early pre-
proposal stage of the EU’s policy cycle. Unlike consultative committees, expert
groups advise the Commission on the basis of the Member States’ interest. In general,
expert groups indicate the Member State’s acceptance on a given issue. In this way,
they act as »early warning units« of the Commission: Will Member State »X« and its
administration be able to transpose the directive within a given time period? Will the
envisaged legal act have an effect on the administrative law of Member State »Y«?
The influence of the Council’s working parties may be found at the stage of decision
making. According to van der Knaap, 90% of EC legislation is »adopted« at this
stage.
133   
5.2.3. Comitology Committees as A Starting Point of Reflection
If we put a particular emphasis on the comitology committees, they can briefly be
defined as a number of miscellaneous committees in the process of implementing
European legislation and policies. The comitology process historically originated
from the delegation of Council’s executive powers to the Commission in the early
1960s.
134 The Council's intention was to implement a number of Council regulations
organising the agricultural market. Since this initiative the total amount of these
committees has grown eminently. Generally, the European Commission was
responsible for implementing decisions adopted by the Council (Article 145). In 1987,
the Single European Act (SEA) added a third indent to article 145 of the EEC Treaty.
The Council used this text as basis for adopting the already mentioned so-called
comitology decision, determining three distinct procedures for the exertion of
implementing powers conferred on the Commission - Advisory Committees,
Management committees, and Regulatory committees. Because of its right to finally
choose the kind of implementing committee, the Council prefers management and
regulatory committee procedures. Consequently, the different comitology committee
formulas lead to the question, which kind of multi-level administration is emerging
within the EU system: Is the Commission’s DG-administration dominating? Or the
Member States? Who influences what, whom and in which way? Do committees act
as an independent network of specialists or are they mirroring the Council’s pre-
dominance in the EU’s policy cycle?
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5.2.4. Integration Theories on Administrative Interaction: An Overview
In order to illustrate the wide-spread assumptions and theoretical approaches in
academic debates on EU committees and public administration, we pay special
attention to a set of various administration models like they may be deduced from
theories on European integration.
135 These models are heuristic and ideal archetypes
and do not gain subsistence in this distinct manner. However, to classify the potential
of administrative interaction we are interested in describing these focussed models
might prove helpful. Two different dimensions of participation in the multi-level
system of the European Union can be distinguished - the relationship between the
national and the European level of the EU’s policy process, and the perennial tension
between bureaucracy and government.
5.2.4.1. Realism, Diplomatic Administration, Functional Co-operation and
Intergovernmental Monitoring
Realists conceive the sovereign nation-state as the authoritative actor in cross-border
interactions.
136 Although various inner state actors participate in the making of
political decisions, the nation-state is identified as a unified protagonist of clearly
defined interests and preferences.
137 Following neo-realist assumptions the EU and its
institutional set-up are products of a general strategy of national governments and
their to gain and to keep influence vis-à-vis other countries.
138 „The fundamental goal
of states in any relationship is to prevent others from achieving advances in their
relative capabilities“.
139 Within the framework of the EU, the principal task of
Member States is to retain their supremacy as ‘masters of the Treaty’.
140 National
actors defend and shape an institutional balance favouring the Council and – to a
growing extent – the European Council: the Council's infrastructure is then considered
as an addition to national institutions sharing the control of the Commission's
activities and thus preventing an evolution towards an unrestrained supranational
bureaucracy: „The influence of supranational actors is generally marginal, limited to
situations where they have strong domestic allies.“
141 The style of European law
making is characterised by conflict between Member States in which zero sum games
predominate. Accordingly, the behavioural pattern of actors in the Council of
Ministers would be characterised by unanimous decision-making and distributive –
‘quid-pro-quo’ - or "integrative balancing".
142 National administrations would be
regarded as essential in sheltering the ‘institutional balance’.
The interaction style between the two levels of co-operation-governance would follow
a model of diplomatic administration: Civil servants −  regularly hailing from foreign
ministries and prime minister departments −  would prevent any attempts from
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supranational actors to gain influence. Unlike classic realism, the liberal
intergovernmentalist variant of neo-realism analyses the construction of national
preference building. „National interests are […] neither invariant nor unimportant, but
emerge through domestic political conflict as societal groups compete for political
influence, national and transnational coalitions form, and new political influence,
national and transnational coalitions form, and new policy alternatives are recognized
by governments.“
143 The analysis of the configuration of national interests therefore
includes to look at how actor groups beyond the core of governments and
administrations steer the definition or – as regards public opinion – the background of
interests and preferences: „Groups articulate preferences; governments aggregate
them.“
144 Liberal intergovernmentalism therefore shares the (neo-)realist assumption
on the centrality of Member States’ actors within the EC/EU and it explicitly “denies
the historical and path dependent quality of integration“
145, which both neo-
functionalism and neo-institutionalism stress as the rationale to explain the very
process of “supranational governance”
146 in the European Union.
According to this concept, the committees surrounding the EU’s organisational set-up
are products of a general strategy of national governments and administrations to pass
the way to more influence in the Brussels sphere.
147 The principal task of the
respective administrative committees is to restrain the supremacy of the Member
States as »masters of the treaty«.
148 Particularly the Council’s administrative
infrastructure and the comitology committees are considered as an addition to national
administrations sharing with them the controlling of the Commission’s activities, thus
preventing an evolution towards an unrestrained supranational bureaucracy.
Considering the above mentioned various forms and procedures of comitology
committees, this approach would anticipate a constant trend towards a typology which
would guarantee national civil servants an extremely large influence. Relating to the
question of legitimacy, committees would have a high rating on the scale since they
are representatives of the holders of national sovereignty. Accordingly, realists would
suggest to neglect the relevance or oppose the reality of supranational administration.
Following the model of diplomatic administration, binding European legislation is
principally influenced by national administrations. Civil servants −  regularly hailing
from foreign ministries −  prevent any attempts from supranational actors to gain
influence. As a kind of autonomous bureaucracy, national administrators try both to
emphasise the supremacy over the national politicians and to keep the frequency of
political cross-border meetings restricted. Neither legislative outcomes nor spill-overs
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stem from the few cross-border activities. A different model of European
administration which would fit into the realist conceptualisation of the integration
process would be intergovernmental monitoring: Referring to this model, national
governments dominate the European arena and the administrative bodies. The
sovereign nation-states co-ordinate their policies as it is typical for inter-state relations
under traditional international law. Cross-border interactions are shaped by national
politicians, particularly by ministers of foreign affairs. The very few exterior contacts
take place in intergovernmental conferences or Councils at the level of national
ministers allowing governmental actors to remain sovereign both to external and
internal political decisions. Finally, functional co-operation might also be interpreted
with the theoretic tools offered by realism. The European policy output is shaped by
national government-administration interactions, where co-operation between civil
servants and government depends on the subject to European negotiations.
Consequently, the Brussels based administration serves as sherpa in the interests of
the Member States. The functional and technical requirements determine the number
and depth of administrative interactions. Information inflow would depend on the
performance of national administrations and governments.
5.2.4.2. Federalism and Federal Administration
According to the federalist paradigm, the struggle of national actors for access,
influence and veto powers e.g. for an effective control of the Brussels arena has not
been, is not and will not become successful.
149 Instead, Member States’ actors will be
more and more marginalised and substituted by EC/EU bodies and institutions which
are being transformed from arenas into actors. Each step of treaty building would
increase the role of supra-national institutions and decrease veto powers of Member
States. The behavioural pattern of the Council of Ministers would be dominated by
referring to and using articles providing the option for qualified majority voting.
Those EU-related bodies which bring the national actors together (Council,
COREPER and its related working groups) would be seen as primarily serving the
national interest and thus constituting a major obstacle to a proper federal system
which alone could guarantee efficient, effective and legitimate European policies.
Concomitantly, the attempts of national administrations to lock into the EC/EU
system of supranational governance and government are rejected as a strategy against
the real will of the European people and the path to a federal union.
150 In this view the
European Parliament is a key institution of the constitutional set-up of the (future) EU
government. Federalism would assume a legitimate surpranational order which
formulates far-reaching policy agendas, articulates ideals and brokers strategies for
the deepening of the integration process. The national actors – governments,
administrations and their EC/EU-related agencies – would wither away. Moreover,
inter-administrative bargaining within committees is considered an obstacle to solve
the problems of the European Union and its Member States. In this view the
opposition of the European Parliament to the comitology committees goes beyond the
quest for more power; it is a key issue, in fact, of the constitutional set-up of the EU
government. Consequently, federalist theories on European governance would suggest
to abolish both the management and the regulatory committees. Following this school
of thought, the model of European administration would be a European bureaucracy
                                                
149 Mayne, R. and Pinder, J. (1990), pp. 214-215.
150 Schneider, H.: Föderale Verfassungspolitik für eine Europäische Union, in: Schneider, H. Wessels,
W. (eds.), pp. 21-50.© EIPA May 2000 82
which clearly dominates the national administrative bodies in each relevant field of
European public policy, but which itself is dominated by a supranational government.
Thus, the model of a supranational bureaucracy is - compatible with realist views -
considered as a kind of antagonist. Since federalism suggests a division of
competences between the different levels of policy making (European – National –
Regional  – Local), co-operation between administrations would be modelled
according to the subsidiarity principle. Moreover, federalism would assume a
European Bureaucracy acting as a »political promoter« which formulates far-reaching
policy agendas, articulates ideals and brokers strategies for the deepening of the
integration process.
5.2.4.3. Neo-Functionalism and the Supranational Technocracy
From neo-functional points of view the very nature of integration “is the process
whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their
loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new centre, whose institutions
possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. The end result of
a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the
pre-existing ones.”
151 The main feature of integration would be the concept of
functional, institutional and procedural spill-over - a process which refers “to a
situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation which
the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create a
further condition and need for more action, and so forth.”
152 Consequently, spill-over
gradually involves “more and more people, call(s) for more and more inter-
bureaucratic contact and consultation, thereby creating their own logic in favour of
later decisions, meeting, in a pro-community direction, the new problems which grow
out of the earlier compromises.”
153 Neo-functionalism would thus expect that the
actors tend to expand the scope of mutual commitment and to intensify their
commitment to the original sector(s).
154 In view of this approach, Treaty revisions are
the legally sanctioned products of spill-over processes which provide the EU
institutions with more exclusive powers for shaping binding outputs for its Member
States. The latter would accept their roles as but parts of a process without a fixed
picture of its final outcome. Neo-functional spill over within policy fields and from
one policy area into another would lead to a widening of the functional scope of
EC/EU law i.e. to an increasing number of treaty provisions for a growing number of
policy fields. The EC/EU related structures and procedures of Member States would
be oriented to an emerging supranational bureaucracy. The European bureaucracy
would be expected to act as a ‘political promoter’ which formulates far-reaching
policy agendas, articulates ideals and brokers strategies for the deepening of the
integration process.
Linked with (neo-)functional assessments, comitology committees would be
considered as functional necessities, tackling technical problems together without the
need for further reflection on their democratic legitimisation. In this perspective, one
would expect comitology committees to be arenas where functional „problem-
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solving“ rather than political „bargaining“
155 would dominate the interaction style.
Committees would be conceived as bodies of experts, where people with highly
specialised technical knowledge in a certain area come together in order to shape
European secondary legislation. The participants would not be interested in the exact
legal form of their committee, but in agreements on the basis of common analysis.
Distributive effects, vertically among the two levels, or horizontally between member
countries, would be clearly subordinated to the best technical solution in the interest
of the common good. Neo-functionalism generally explains the growth in number of
committees and in the frequency of their meetings as product of spill-over
processes.
156 Given this basic orientation, the neo-functionalist model of European
administration would be characterised by the existence of relevant administrative
interactions depending in its number and characteristics primarily on the functional
scope of the Union. Cross-border contacts would be considered a necessary addition
to the interstate adjusted bureaucracy. These interactions strengthen the proficiency of
national administrations in finding adequate task-orientated solutions without
lessening the conventional relationship to other interstate actors or distressing the
relationship to political leadership. The impact of supranational actors remains to
some extent restricted, domestic political concerns dominate the convenience of
national actors for supranational co-operation. Whereas the model of functional co-
operation would suggest a dominance of the national level in European policy
making, the model of a supranational technocracy would tend to argue, that the
European level, i.e. the European Commission and its Directorates General, would
dominate the game of policy field oriented administration. Similar to the model of
functional co-operation, this kind of bureaucracy would not depend on a particular
constitutional basis or on certain institutional arrangements which organise joint
decision-making. The co-operation of national and European civil servants would not
be undertaken for its own merits, but seen as a chance to find problem-orientated
solutions finding on the European level. The technical requirements determine the
number and depth of administrative interactions. However, unlike functional co-
operation, information inflow and the specific demands for implementing European
secondary legislation would depend on the services of the Commission and only to a
lesser extent on those of national administrations.
5.2.4.4. The Erosion View and the Model of a European Mega-Bureaucracy
In view of an erosion school of thought,
157 bureaucratic expansion is the consequence
of national and European administration's intense interactions, shaping together a
multi-level Mega-Bureaucracy.
158 By pursuing a highly regulated multi-level game,
bureaucrats from both the European and the national level would emphasise their
autonomy against the political class by using their administrative experience.
159 As
experts in complex administrative procedures, they mutually would replace
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democratic policy-makers, thus constructing a conglomerate unmatched by
parliamentary or judicial control – instances to which national administrations are
normally subjected. The “logic of bureaucracy” membership and the influence which
the involved actors may execute would produce a strong „logic of committees“.
160
The participating civil servants betray their governments and populations alike. Thus,
the individual citizen would be confronted with a multi-layer functional set-up which
is not willing to create loyalty or to establish any kind of solidarity with the public. By
excluding others from their activities, mega-bureaucracies create an independent
political space, which is different from norms established by legislatures or elected
governments. In this perspective, the model of mega-bureaucracy is not only the result
of »Eurocrats«, but also of national administrations, leading both to enlarge their areas
of influence which are uncontrollable by others. The characteristic indicators of the
mega-bureaucracy are largely explicable in terms of an unlimited coincidence of
national and supranational administrative structures. Using their special bureaucratical
abilities both civil servants of the Commission and national civil servants would use
administrative interactions to prevent any serious control. The disappearance of other
actors leads to a »government by committee« with low efficiency.
5.2.4.5. Governance, Fusion theory and the Models of Horizontal and Vertical Fusion
and Mixed Administration
In view of major approaches within the modern i.e. post-1989 school of governance
the institutional and procedural changes in the EU treaties need to be analysed as one
particular element of rather minor relevance within the complex multi-level game of
the EU.
161 The EU polity is seen as a “post-sovereign, polycentric, incongruent”
arrangement of authority which supersedes the limits of the nation-state.
162 Assuming
a non-hierarchical decision-making process, the EU does matter but as one realm for
collective decision-making and implementation. In other terms, “policy-making in the
Community is at its heart a multilateral inter-bureaucratic negotiation marathon”.
163
As formalised and informal networks
164 among different and several groups of actors
are the decisive arenas for decision-making, formal rules are generally less taken as a
major factor. The ‘governance-inspired’ pendulum thesis then assumes some kind of
cyclical up and down between "fusion and diffusion".
165 This "pattern of the
pendulum varies over time and across issues, responding to little endogenous and
exogenous factors, and including shifts between dynamics and static periods or arenas
of co-operation“
166. With Maastricht as a more permanent fixture
167 leads to an
"unstable equilibrium"
168 where 'Europeanisation'- and 're-nationalisation'-trends
come into a close competition. In clear contrast to neo-realism and
intergovernmentalism some contributions of multi-level governance would conceive
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the European Parliament as an active player in the net. “Irrespective of whether the EP
provides legitimacy of European executive decisions, it certainly interferes with the
negotiating process.”
169 It can, and sometimes does, overturn the results of negotiation
in and around the Commission and the Council. 'Maastricht' would however not
constitute a major structural change for the daily governance practices of the EU.
Even if the European Parliament is seen as „perhaps the largest net beneficiary of the
institutional changes in the TEU“
170, multi-level governance would not expect the
Parliament as a key player in the EU’s arenas. From the perspective of this school of
thought, Member State structures do merely perform as unified actors. They rather
matter as arenas of collective decision preparation and implementation, thus
indicating a new stage for both administrations and for the state. European governance
thus contributes to a „decrease in the unilateral steering by government, and hence an
increase in the self-governance of networks“.
171 Accordingly, changes with regard to
the style of EC/EU-related interaction mechanisms could be taken as a significant
indicator for this phenomenon.
In view of this school of thought, administrative interaction might be regarded as one
particular element within the complex multi-level game of the EU. Assuming a non-
hierarchical decision-making process overarching the geographical limits of the EU
and its Member States beyond, committees do not (intend to) move the EU into a
certain direction or transform its basic character and organisation. Instead, they
perform as defenders of the status quo. Committees do matter as arenas for
deliberation and collective problem-solving. If „good governance” contributes to a
„decrease in the unilateral steering by government, and hence an increase in the self-
governance of networks“, committees could be taken as a significant indicator for this
phenomenon.
172
The fusion theory
173 goes beyond the analysis of the integration at a given (set of)
time and offers tools to understand the very process of interaction and joint problem-
solving beyond the state. It regards EU institutions and committees as core channels
and instruments by interested actors - national governments and administrations,
MEP, other public and private actors - increasingly pool and share public resources
from several levels to argue on commonly identified problems and to attain
commonly identified goals. Institutional and procedural growth and differentiation –
starting from the ECSC onwards - signal and reflect a growing participation of several
actors from different levels, which is sometimes overshadowed by cyclical ups and
downs in a political conjuncture. However, each ‘up’ leads to a ratchet effect by
which the level of activities in the valley of day-to-day politics will have moved to a
higher plateau. The major feature of this process is a ‘fusion’ of public instruments
from several state levels linked with the respective ‘Europeanisation’ of supranational,
national, regional and de-nationalised actors and institutions. The result is a new grade
of institutional and procedural complexity once put into the treaties. On the national
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level the fusion thesis suggests a significant trend of Europeanisation.
174 EU policy
making thus triggers institutional adaptation in the Member States, alters domestic
rules and the interinstitutional distribution of means for complying with the
requirements for an effective participation in European governance. National and
regional actors socialise with the EU legislative process and are continuing with an
extensive process of adaptation to the procedures.
The fusion theory
175 regards committees as indicators of the permanent process of
combining and sharing resources from several institutional and instrumental levels.
Committees are the manifestation of growing Europeanisation of national
administrations. In this view, committees in general and comitology committees in
particular are significant in the way the European Court of Justice has put it: if powers
„fall partly into the competences of the Community and in part within that of the
Member States it is essential to ensure close co-operation between the Member States
and the Community institutions”.
176 Thus, committees with national and European
civil servants are examples and a main driving force behind the merging of public
instruments. They are to some extent a product of the increasing competition for
access and influence in the EU policy cycle. We could distinguish between the model
of horizontal and vertical fusion and the model of co-operative administration, which
mainly differ with regard to the level of influence of administrative bodies against
governments. The model of vertical and horizontal Fusion would help us to design
interrelated processes of Europeanisation on the level between the Member States and
EC/EU institutions on the one hand and on the level between national and European
administrative bodies on the other. Like in the case of the new Economic and
Financial Committee (EFC), both Europeanised levels of interaction (Commission
and European Central Bank (ECB) on the EC level and Member States representatives
on the national level) meet in a special committee which co-ordinates views and
opinions of Member State and EC/EU administratives on a given set of issues (Article
114 [ex-Article 109c] EC-Treaty). The fusion theory would expect that committees
like the EFC would neither act as the »guard dogs« of national governments charged
with controlling the ECB or the European Commission nor as forums for more
intergovernmental negotiations. In opposition to both views, committees would rather
behave as specialised bodies for joint action. Consequently specific interaction styles
within committees - horizontally between its members and other committees [e.g.
between the EFC and the ECOFIN working groups or the EC Employment
committee] and vertically between its members and other specialised Member States
institutions/committees - are to be expected: “a constructive team spirit, a confidential
club atmosphere, an effective collegiality will dominate over strict interpretation of
legal texts and formal rules”.
177 Unlike horizontal/vertical fusion, co-operative
administration would be more oriented towards and more dependant on the Member
States’ governments level. A good example could be the new CFSP planning and
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early warning unit established by the Treaty of Amsterdam, where the members (from
the Member States and the Commission) will act under the auspices of the Council’s
Secretary General and in the interest of the »joint strategic decisions« to be
formulated by the European Council.
5.2.5. Growth and Differentiation – Empirical Trends
Concentrating on the development of the EC/EU’s policy agenda between 1952
(ECSC-Treaty) and 1997 (Amsterdam Treaty), we observe an extension of
responsibilities leading to an extensively enlarged scope of action. The total number
of Treaty articles dealing with decision making rules in specific policy areas has
considerably grown from 64 (EEC Treaty 1957) to 195 (Amsterdam Treaty).
178
Committees are both a product and a tool of the European policy making process.
Consequently, the EC/EU legislative output, i.e. the sum of binding decisions adopted
either by the Council of Ministers and - since 1 November 1993 – of the European
Parliament and the Council (acting under the codecision procedure) or by the European
Commission gives a first impression about the potential for European governance by
committees. Thus, we have to sketch out a general assessment on the EC/EU’s
legislative output from the ECSC onwards. Altogether, we can list a total sum of
52.799 legal acts adopted between 1952 and December 1998.
179 Of course, these legal
acts are not of equal ranking in terms of their legal relevance. Besides regulations,
directives, decisions and recommendations authorised by the Council, the European
Parliament and the Council or the Commission, the EU’s databases also include a set
of political events which are less binding (conclusions of the Council of a political
nature etc.). The European Commission’s output started to grow from 1976 onwards,
although the relative growth maintained stable between 1980 and 1993. With the
coming into force of Maastricht, it decreased dramatically; reflecting the net decline
in Council legislation from 1986/1987 onwards.
Institutional growth leads to institutional specialisation and differentiation: Since
1958, the number of the European Commission’s Directorates General has grown
from 9 to 24 in 1995 (in fact, DG I is split into three different DG’s: DG I –
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Commercial Policy and Relations with North America, the Far East, Australia and
New Zealand, DG IA – Europe and NIS, External Policy and CFSP, and DG IB –
Southern Mediterranean, Middle and Near East, Latin America, South and Southeast
Asia and North-South Cooperation). Institutional partiality at the EC level also leads
to a broader involvement of national administrations in coping with the daily business
of the Euro-polity. Today, nearly every national ministry sends representatives to
Brussels both to Council meetings and meetings of its working groups under
COREPER I and II as well as to the Commission’s expert and comitology
committees. Summarising the various bodies we can list for 1995 roughly 270
working groups, approximately 400 comitology committees and at least 600 expert
groups and ad-hoc advisory committees for the Commission – altogether the
administrative infrastructure includes at least around 1.300 bodies. Again, we observe
a remarkable growth along the evolution of the EU and as well a linear trend.
According to the policy cycle, comitology committees are precisely settled in the
implementation phase. Due to the different rights conferred upon national civil
servants in the comitology committees it is rather laborious to assess the concrete
influence of these bodies in shaping European law. Nevertheless, it can safely be said
that the comitology network is confronted with a growing number of policy fields and
thus in some way decisive for preparing, taking and implementing the concrete
»appearance« of the EU in relation to its »User-Community«. However, the overall
picture which we get from the comitology network embodies divergent specimen but
also convergent patterns. For the very concrete impact of each committee indicators
such as the issue at stake, the type or character of a given policy area (regulatory,
redistributive or programmatic), the legal basis (specifying the type of legislation
allowed, the Council’s voting rules and the decision making procedures with regard to
the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions) or the origin of a dominant chairperson might be more
relevant. Some committees may have the right to harmonise technical or economic
standards, other may only have the task to revise the appendices of original
legislation. This should be analysed on a case to case basis.
If functional growth leads to institutional growth, differentiation, specialisation and
administrative fragmentation in the Member States, co-ordination becomes a crucial
element of efficient and effective policy-making. Both qualitative analysis and
empirical data illustrate a more elaborate co-ordination in the Member States.
180
Approximately 25% of all higher civil servants of the German government are
directly involved in miscellaneous kinds and on various levels of EU policy making.
These interaction patterns involve many levels of the national administration
hierarchy. For instance, in the case of the Federal Republic of Germany around 500
civil servants from the »Länder« administrations are increasingly involved in EC/EU
Council negotiations dealing with education, culture, research, justice and home
affairs.
National and European administrations and governments are not alone in the Brussels
sphere. To illustrate the quantitative growth in the various forms of interest
representation, lobby groups and NGO’s are a remarkable example. The number of
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listed groups has increased to approximately 2.000 representations of interest groups
in Brussels in 1996.
181 These actors turn out to play an increasingly significant role,
both in the respective political systems of Western Europe and in the European sphere
and in shaping the preparing, taking and implementing of binding legal acts. National
and supranational administrations are forced to take these actors into consideration as
competitors or partners.
5.2.6. The Models Revisited
Our overview indicates that from the original EEC Treaty to the Treaty on the
European Union many core issues of public policy have become subject to
supranational decision making procedures. Like policy fields and decision making
norms, institutions have been further developed or been newly introduced in order to
cope with the functional scope of the EC/EU. Like the Parliament, the Council and the
Commission, committees are the result of both functionalist institution-building and
bargaining. They are part of the EC/EU’s institutional structure and do not purely and
simply constitute a neutral arena, but structure the policy processes according to a
variety of norms, rules and procedures. Thus, analysing committees in an unsettled
but moving environment means to scrutinise the various interactions between
European and national governmental as well as bureaucratic actors, companies, non-
profit and private interest representatives. If any dominant factor is to be made
responsible for the popular fears of the »bureaucratisation« in Brussels, it is the
specific constellation of a de-nationalised public authority and the impact of the
various multi-level arenas acting therein. Consequently, the patterns of administrative
interaction can not only be analysed as a search for consensus between a limited and
stable number of actors. Not only the well-known kinds of formal bargaining or other
asymmetric dependency situations should be examined minutely, but as well the
exchange of resources on the basis of equality and mutuality. Due to their particular
character, administrative interactions have to be investigated beyond the formal
structures of the EC/EU policy-cycle.
If we compare the explanative power of the different models of administrative
interaction, the empirical validity test does not paint a clear unequivocal picture.
Certainly it can be concluded that committees in the EC/EU system are no artificial
creation, nor a typical development by pure accidental factors, nor merely a
bureaucratic plot to keep, or even extend, their influence. Whereas the Member States
acting in the Council of Ministers dominate the creation of comitology committees –
as realism (?) would suggest -, the concrete business of policy implementation
through comitology is clearly shaped by the European Commission – an argument
fitting more into federalist conceptualisation of a federal administration. And indeed,
according to van der Knaap, the Commission gets its own way in 99% of all cases.
However, the EC/EU’s committee system is not characterised by a tendency whereby
the different bodies are being replaced by pure Community institutions. The realist
concept of diplomatic administration hardly corresponds to our empirical findings.
Committee members in the Council’s sub-units or acting in the European
Commission’s committee network may feel a certain type of »togetherness«. But
given the Commission’s power to dominate the game of implementing measures on
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the one hand, and the powers of the Council in establishing committees, as well as the
power of the Member States to nominate their representatives and the power of the
European Parliament to scrutinise the comitology system at least to a certain extent on
the other hand, the image of independent diplomats shaping the preparation and
implementation of EC law without the Commission is rather misleading. Of course, if
we focus our view exclusively on the committee networks in the field of justice and
home affairs established prior to the Maastricht Treaty (within the Schengen and the
TREVI regime), we would have to acknowledge a certain trend of intergovernmental
monitoring combined with some kind of governmentally monitored diplomatic
administration between the early 1980s and the post-Maastricht era. However, since
Maastricht came into effect, the TREVI committee structure of the third pillar has
shifted towards functional cooperation with a pre-dominance of the national level at
all stages of the policy process.
182 Some of the indicators may suggest neo-
functionalism as the most appropriate tool for investigating the committee network in
the field of EC legislation. Especially the evolution of the Council’s and the
Commission’s legislative output (graph 1) in comparison to the increase of
comitology committees (graph 2) suggests to conceptualise administrative interaction
as a supranational technocracy in process. However, qualitative studies on national
administrations and their interaction within the EU do not indicate subsequent shifts
of loyalty from the nation-state towards the EU committee systems as neo-
functionalism would suggest. The concept of a multi-level mega-bureaucracy would
expect growing complexity and a lack of transparency, hence administrative
interaction networks that are impossible to control either by the European Parliament
or by the national parliaments of the Member States. However, this concept ignores
that the control capacities of the European Parliament, especially with regard to the
comitology system, have been developed. This is not to say that Parliament’s
demands regarding the accountability of the comitology network have been fulfilled.
But especially in those cases of post-Maastricht secondary legislation, where the
codecision procedure applies, the European Parliament is able to influence the choice
and to control the operation of comitology procedures.
183
Our interpretation leads to a characterisation of both the committee system and the
administrative interaction taking place according to the concepts of horizontal and
vertical fusion and co-operative administration. The growth rates of the meetings of
Council working groups, of the number of civil servants, of the frequency of
comitology meetings in the field of agriculture and of the expenditure for comitology
meetings, indicate a process of institutional and personal mobilisation within an
evolving (?) and concentric political system, in which national administrations are
shifting their attention towards Brussels. The challenges of a Commission providing
the operational rules of comitology, the claims of a Parliament pressing COREPER
into »pre-conciliation« meetings for codecision and the demands of interest groups
offering advice and bringing in »transnational« expertise spill back into national
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administrative systems. Moreover, national civil servants are increasingly confronted
with different administrative cultures and interaction styles. Consequently,
mobilisation leads to some kind of Europeanisation of institutions and staff.
Thus, we need further research into the administrative interaction in process. Special
attention should be given to the question, if the emerging networks are changing the
hierarchical institutional system or if they are leading to some kind of non-
hierarchical governance. In other words, we propose a closer look into the real
application of the committee rules by the different actors concerned.
5.2.7 European Parliament Committees
The Treaty on European Union (both the Maastricht and the Amsterdam version)
strengthened the position and role of the European Parliament. Despite the reduction
of the democratic deficit in institutional terms, developments after the conclusion of
the TEU have led to a loss of public support and made the project of integration more
contested than ever within the Member States; the post-Maastricht discourse on
democracy and democratic governance in the Union seems to have weakened the
legitimacy of the Union.
184
This paradox hints at different perspectives from which legitimacy can be defined.
While legitimacy understood as an attribute of the political system of the EU has been
strengthened, legitimacy as an orientation among the citizens has decreased. The
tension between both dimensions of legitimacy has been one of the characteristics of
the development of the integration process.
5.2.7.1 Situating the European Parliament in Flux
Whatever the language used, political scientists and lawyers classify the EC/EU as a
system for joint decision-making in which actors from two or more levels of
governance interact in order to solve common (and commonly identified) problems.
Whereas the areas of co-operation and integration were originally restricted to the
coal and steel industry and its related labour markets, the European Union of the Third
Millennium pertains on a much wider scope of potential action: Nearly every field of
traditional state activity can become subject to policy-building beyond the nation-
state. But can we also observe the dynamics of this system?
Neo-institutionalism and the 'path' dependency approach of policy preferences,
institutions and procedures, policy-outcomes and policy-instruments
185 offers one
important step among our starting considerations. The ‘masters of the treaties’ i.e. the
Member States seek not only for functional, but also for institutional solutions to
shared problems on the basis of what already exists. Critical junctures - revisions of
the Treaties or exogenous developments affecting the EC/EU or a major part of it -
offer the chance to adapt and to 're-design' the existing arrangements.
186 The logic of
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'path-dependency' suggests that in such an institutionalised arrangement like the
EC/EU, "past lines of policy [will] condition subsequent policy by encouraging
societal forces to organise along some lines rather than others, to adapt particular
identities or to develop interests in policies that are costly to shift".
187 Institutions -
rules and procedural routines at both the national and the European levels of
governance - therefore become capable to "structure political situations and leave
their own imprint on political outcomes".
188 In other terms, institutional arrangements
contour the realm for further developments insofar as they narrow "down the areas for
possible change" and oblige the actors to "think of incremental revision of existing
arrangements".
189
One of the key elements of European democratic systems is that directly elected
parliaments represent the citizens, aggregate their views and opinions and act on their
behalf. In this regard, the EU’s institutional design faces a multitude of questions as to
how representative this system of multi-level governance is, in which way its quasi-
executive branches – the Council and the Commission - are accountable to the citizens
via a directly legitimated body and how democratic the decision making procedures
between the Union’s legislative authorities are. Of course arguing about the European
Parliament and its potential to provide the European “Demoi” - functionally,
nationally or ideologically different realms of identity and interest formation and
communication - a representative voice in the Union’s policy cycle does not mean that
de-nationalised, supra-national parliamentarism is the only way for bridging the gap
between the citizens and the Union. Accordingly one can easily assume that even with
the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, many scholars and practitioners of
European integration will continue to argue that focusing on the input structures of the
Union is only one of several ways in which governance “beyond the state”
190 might
gain legitimacy. However, since the EU story is not only about territory and identity
or - in the language of the German Constitutional Court, about culture, shared
heritage, language and ethnic belonging it is logical to (?) assume that any kind of
supra- or super-national governance structure without a directly elected parliamentary
structure would pervert the Union into a dictatorial regime. In other terms, I conceive
the European Parliament and the “parliamentarisation” of the Union’s decision
making system must be concieved (?) as one but an essential and necessary tool for
building a legitimate European order.
Of course, the process of European integration does not feature clear and unequivocal
trends towards the establishment of nation-state like government structures. In the
contrary, the main idea of integration is the continuous search for problem-solving
capacities in specific policy areas without explicitly considering the mode of
appropriate government structures.
However, the cumulative process of functional, special-purpose or single-policy oriented
integration affects the institutional design and the decision-making process between
institutions on both European and national (and to a growing extent even sub-national
and sub-regional) levels of governance. Accordingly, the process of co-operation and
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integration leads to what Wessels defines as a "fusion" of national and Community
instruments where major actors of the EU Member States try to achieve an increase in
effectiveness for preparing, taking and implementing decisions through European
institutions. Given these indicators, one may agree to the assumption that the European
Parliament “does not operate as part of, or in relation to, a system of government”.
191 But
European integration is more than an ongoing bargaining process on politics. More
specifically, the European Community and – at least with regard to the third pillar – the
European Union are entitled to limit national sovereignty. Not only the Member States,
but the Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the Court are enabled to take
decisions directly binding the residents of its constituent Member States without the
prior and individual assent of each national government. The European Parliament
should be analysed in this context.
For many, the Maastricht Treaty indicated major implications for the European
Parliament and its roles vis-à-vis the other institutions, specifically the Council and
the Commission. They argued that the European Parliament ”was perhaps the largest
net beneficiary of the institutional changes in the TEU”
192 and that ”Maastricht marks
the point in the Community’s development at which the Parliament became the first
chamber of a real legislature; and the Council is obliged to act from time to time like a
second legislative chamber rather than a ministerial directorate”.
193 Hence, through
the introduction of the co-decision procedure, the European Parliament gained more
control in the legislative process (- it can prevent the adoption of legislation -) and
acquired more means of input into binding EC legislation (- the final legislative act
requires Parliament’s explicit approval -). With regard to the impact of the European
Parliament on the EU’s legislative output, and therefore the potential of its “output-
legitimacy”, the co-decision procedure itself was interpreted as being (too) complex,
lengthy, cumbersome and protracted.
194 Indeed, the procedure described in the then
Article 189b TEC (now 251), could well be interpreted as symptomatic for the
“general trade-off” between the efficiency of EU decision-making on the one hand
and parliamentary involvement on the other. “Expanding the legislative (...) powers of
the European Parliament could render European decision processes, already too
complicated and time-consuming, even more cumbersome”.
195
(Perhaps you want to add a sentence that your research has demonstrated that this - at
least in quantitative terms- is not the case)
5.3. Democratic Legitimacy of Governance by Committees
The proliferation of transnational policy making has had crucial implications for
traditional conceptions of democracy: grounded in the institutions of the nation state
reflecting and responding to the Demos. Despite the construction of supranational
institutions modelled on key organs of liberal democratic states (executive,
legislature, judiciary etc.) since its inception' the European Union has been unable to
fill the democratic deficit;
196) that has accompanied its development. More recently
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with the expansion of the EU's competence into areas of greater overtly political
sensitivity for states and citizens (including Justice and Home Affairs and monetary
union, as well as foreign and security policy) and a growing Euro-scepticism among
the EU's publics, the democratic deficit has developed further as the leitmotif for the
future of European integration.
The issue of democratic legitimacy plays a significant role in western political
systems; interestingly, it reveals special importance if related to the European Union,
arousing heated debates among scholars of European integration studies. While each
of the EU Member States enjoys some kind of a democratic government, the EU as a
political system is widely perceived to suffer from what is called a ‘democratic
deficit’.
197 The EU’s institutions and their national counterparts face a multitude of
questions as to how transparent, representative and responsive the system of multi-
level governance is, in which way the Union’s quasi-executive branches are
accountable to a directly legitimated body and how democratic the decision making
procedures between the Union’s legislative authorities are.
Although the two major functions of committees in the EC political process –
mastering technical expertise and multi-level co-ordination – are uncontroversial and
generally viewed as legitimate, the EC committee system is frequently criticised from
two different points of view:
Committees are seen as embodying the most opaque and even secret part of EC
decision making. They are considered to be the most intransparent aspect of the EC
system of governance.
The committee system also raises serious questions about the democratic legitimacy
of the EC policy process. They are not mentioned in the treaties and their proliferation
is often seen as a deviation from EC "constitutional" rules. Since their members are
not elected on a democratic basis (except for those of the EP committees), committees
are frequently seen as symbolising the "democratic deficit" and "bureaucratic and
technocratic bias" of the EC system. In short, the EC committee system challenges
traditional perceptions of democracy which value the transparency of decisions that
should, in addition, only to be taken by elected and politically accountable
representatives of the people.
On the other hand, it can be argued that the growing complexity of economic and
social regulation in European societies, combined with the increasing range of
Community policy responsibilities, has lead to a situation where many of the
decisions taken at Community level are both highly technical in nature and involve
intricate processes of multi-level negotiations and co-ordination.
From this perspective, new developments in democratic theory, informed by
regulation theory, have sought to "update" classical democratic concerns (in terms of
legitimacy, transparency and accountability) by confronting them with the growing
need for an autonomous regulatory competence with technical expertise.
198 Classical
democratic requirements can be met by different means, for example through the
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"technical" delegation of powers from democratically elected authorities to "expert
bodies", or through a "cross-control" system whereby one set of experts control
another.
199
Working groups and comitology committees, for example, can be deemed legitimate
from this point of view because they act in the name of the democratically elected
Member State governments. The standing committees of the EP derive their
legitimacy from the fact that their members are democratically elected. Their
expertise function – supported through a relatively large professional staff – may also
be seen as providing a means of ensuring there are "checks and balances" on the
technical expertise of the Council's working groups.
Theoretically informed empirical research on the role and function of committees in
the EC policy process commenced only a few years ago. Recent publications have
contributed to elaborate typologies of the different types of committees according to
their role in the EC policy process and their internal rules of procedures. Much
attention has also been drawn to the inter-institutional debate about comitology
committees. Most of the research has been essentially institutional and descriptive,
trying to assess the functions of the different kinds of committees in the EC policy
process: providing "technical" expertise, rule-setting, fund-approving, consensus-
building, inter-level co-ordination, "networking", influencing policy, etc.
Building on this body of research, the proposed project will focus on the question of
to what extent, and how, different committees in the EC policy process go beyond
their basic functions as providers of technical expertise and fora of multi-level co-
ordination and constitute a central aspect of the “democratic legitimacy” of the
evolving system of European governance. Democratic legitimacy is not interpreted
using traditional legal concepts but is based on the notion that governing and
regulating complex contemporary systems requires delegating the solution of
technical problems to competent bodies of “experts” that are controlled by
democratically elected institutions and which (in a multi-level system) mutually
provide a means of “checks and balances”.
200
The Definition of a political order as being legitimate when it is worthy of recognition
and approval (Anerkennungswürdigkeit) and thus encourages social integration,
communication and consensus, stems from Habermas.
201 There can be distinguished
three elements that are required in order to establish the legitimacy of a constitutional
order:
202
“auctoritas” – the respectability and trustworthiness of the political actors of a system
of governance – otherwise the system must be treated with contempt (Verachtung);
problem solving capability and an ability to accomplish tasks (“finale Legitimation”)
otherwise the system is meaningless (sinnlos);
a structure, which inspires and secures consensus, and which is limited and controlled,
otherwise the system would be despotic (despotisch).
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Similar concepts of legitimacy – all further developments of Max Weber’s typology
(legal, traditional, charismatic) – can be found in social and political theories of the
20th century such as Parsons AGIL scheme, where legitimacy is derived through
Adaptation, Goal attainment, Integration and Latent pattern maintenance.
203
Of particular relevance is Jachtenfuchs’ definition of legitimacy and democracy
within the framework of EU governance: “By legitimacy, I understand a generalised
degree of trust of the addressees of the EU’s institutional and policy outcomes
towards the emerging political system”. As Weiler
204 pointed out, a political system
which is entitled to limit national sovereignty and which is enabled to take decisions
directly binding the residents of its constituent Members without the prior and
individual assent of each national government requires more than the formal approval
of founding treaties and their subsequent amendments. In Weiler’s terms, such a
political system - like the European Union - needs social legitimacy: The willingness
of minorities to accept the decisions of the majority within the boundaries of the EU’s
polity.
205 In other words, social legitimacy supposes that decisions which are not
taken by unanimity at all levels of and at every stage in the policy cycle have to be
based on a broad acceptance of the system. Even if the citizenry of the EU polity is
not fully aware of or interested in the way binding decisions about their way of life
are taken, the system and the institutions which deliver the law must be aware of the
risk that the public attitude towards it can shift from some kind of a “permissive
consensus” or “benevolent indifference” (Brok, 1999) to fundamental scepticism. By
democracy, ‘Jachtenfuchs’ understands the “institutionalization of a set of procedures
for the control of governance which guarantees the participation of those who are
governed in the adoption of collectively binding decisions”.
206 Of course, this
definition does not automatically induce democracy to be synonymous with
parliamentary government. At least theoretically, there are many ways to secure the
participation of the citizenry in governing a given polity. But if we turn to the
evolution of the EU over the last decades, we observe a trend: The search for
establishing some kind of representative governance structures, in which institutions
aggregate participation needs and try to fulfil their general function as arenas and
rules for making binding decisions, and for structuring the relationship between
individuals in various units of the polity and economy.
207
In this sense, the lack of control over governments firstly on the national and secondly
on the European level – the Council of the EU - creates a "double democratic
deficit".
208 Of course, those stressing that national sovereignty resists European
integration would argue that decision-making in the EU rests primarily upon the
Member States and the Council of Ministers and, since Maastricht and Amsterdam,
upon the European Council. Accordingly they would ascribe only a minor role to the
European Parliament and parliamentary institutions in general.
209 However, since the
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entry into force of the Single European Act (SEA) and the introduction of the co-
operation as well as the assent procedure, the real distribution of powers between the
institutions goes far beyond this conceptualisation of the Union. Within the sphere of
the European Communities, the Treaty revisions from 1986 onwards reveal a
tendency towards a multi-level Polity where competencies are not only shared
between the Members of the Council but also between the Council and the European
Parliament. Nevertheless, even if the SEA, the Maastricht and the Amsterdam Treaty
(TEU) opened new opportunities for an original kind of parliamentary democracy in
the EC/EU, they left considerable gaps in parliamentary involvement and control in
many policy areas which directly affect the way of living of the Union’s citizens.
From a functional or technocratic point of view it could be argued that legitimacy is
delivered by the success of problem-solving and does not need further justification: In
this perspective, the EU may be seen as some kind of a ‘regulatory regime’
210 or a
“special purpose organisation”
211, which is less dependant on its parliamentary
democracy than on efficiently-oriented policies. The “output-legitimacy” of the Union
then “depends on its capacity to achieve the citizen’s goals and solve their problems
effectively and efficiently: The higher this capacity, the more legitimate the
system”.
212 This concept does not go far enough, because it ignores the fact that
legitimacy is not purely built on the substantial outcome of politics –dictatorial
regimes are also able to produce positive output.
The lack of democratic accountability and transparency seems to constitute one of the
most serious problems of the EC/EU committee network. Consequently, new insights
on the level of secrecy, on the public acceptance of discretionary policy making, and
on the interaction between parliamentary committee structures on the one hand and
administrative bodies taking ultimately binding decisions on the other should be
considered. (I would suggest to delete this)
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